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This	 dissertation	 enquires	 into	 the	 metaphysics	 of	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	 by	
examining	 the	 thought	 of	 Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli	 (1499-1562)	 as	 a	 case	 study.	 In	 this	
introduction,	I	will	first	situate	the	present	work	in	relation	to	earlier	scholarly	literature	
on	the	philosophical	background	of	the	Protestant	Reformation.	This	will	lead,	secondly,	





During	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 two	 scholarly	 discourses	 were	 concerned	 with	 the	







philosophical	 background	 of	 the	 Reformation,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 enquiring	 into	 the	
structures	of	being	and	causality	implicit	in	the	theological	work	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli.	
The	merit	of	 this	approach,	 I	will	argue,	 is	 that	 it	enables	us	more	clearly	 to	express	a	
complexity	 that	 is	 present	 in	 Vermigli’s	 thought	 –	 and	 arguably	 also	 in	 that	 of	 other	
Reformers.	
A	 work	 regularly	 cited	 in	 the	 debates	 around	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
Reformation	 and	 Protestant	 (especially	 Reformed)	 scholasticism	 is	 Brian	 Armstrong’s	
1969	 study,	Calvinism	and	 the	Amyraut	Heresy.	 In	 this	 study	Armstrong	proposes	 that	
there	 is	 a	 significant	 rift	 between	 the	 “humanistically	 oriented”	 and	 “biblically	 and	
																																																						









which	 had	 been	 carefully	 constructed	 by	 Calvin	 to	 represent	 faithfully	 the	 scriptural	
teaching.”3	This	is	the	background	against	which	Armstrong	analyses	the	work	of	Moïse	
Amyraut	 (1596-1664),	 a	 professor	 of	 theology	 at	 the	 Academy	 of	 Saumur.	 Armstrong	
proposes	that	Amyraut	was	wrongly	considered	a	heretic	by	the	‘orthodox’	Protestants	of	
his	 time.	 Indeed,	 he	 holds	 that	 Amyraut	 was	 more	 faithful	 to	 Calvin	 than	 any	 of	 his	
allegedly	 orthodox,	 Protestant	 scholastic	 contemporaries.	 But	 how	 did	 it	 happen	 that	
these	Protestant	scholastics	diverged	so	much	from	Calvin’s	theology?	It	is	here	that	Peter	
Martyr	Vermigli	–	together	with	Girolamo	Zanchi	and	Theodore	Beza	–	plays	a	major	role	
in	 Armstrong’s	 account.	 Armstrong	 argues	 that	 the	 scholasticism	 that	 “held	 sway”	 in	























Aristotle	while	 in	Strasbourg	to	“point	 in	 [the]	direction”	of	his	“scholasticism.”8	These	
three	reasons	–	all	formulated	in	tentative	terms	or	in	the	conditional	tense	–	are	all	the	




architecture	 of	 Armstrong’s	 book	 and	 flows	 from	 its	 implicit	 premises.	 As	mentioned	
above,	 Armstrong	 asserts	 that	 Moïse	 Amyraut	 was	 more	 faithful	 to	 Calvin	 than	 his	
contemporaries,	 such	 as,	 for	 instance,	 Pierre	 Du	Moulin	 (1568-1658).	 That	 this	 is	 no	
impartial	 exegetical	 observation,	 but	 rather	 a	 value	 judgement,	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 his	
description	of	 the	scholasticism	of	Du	Moulin	and	others.	Protestant	scholasticism,	 for	
Armstrong,	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 tendency	 to	 “assert[]	 religious	 truth	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
deductive	ratiocination”	in	such	a	way	that	“reason	assumes	at	least	equal	standing	with	
faith	in	theology,	thus	jettisoning	some	of	the	authority	of	revelation.”10	This	description	
has	 a	 negative	 overtone,	 especially	 when	 contrasted	with	 the	 “dynamic,	 experiential,	
historically,	and	exegetically	grounded	faith	enunciated	by	Calvin”	(as	one	reviewer	highly	
sympathetic	to	Armstrong’s	project	put	it).11	In	Armstrong’s	view,	the	scholastic	“systems”	
of	 Du	 Moulin	 and	 the	 like	 are	 simply	 “narrow,”	 “defensive,”	 “intolerant,”	 and	
“impervious.”12		




















esteemed	by	the	scholastics	of	Amyraut’s	time.14	 In	sum,	 it	seems	therefore	 likely	that	
Armstrong’s	bias	against	Vermigli	in	particular	originates	from	his	implicit	agreement	with	








point	 and	 yet	 was	 not	 anti-intellectual	 obscurantism.”15	 In	 liberalism,	 the	 Kantian	
approach	won	the	battle,	and	hence	labelled	Protestant	scholastic	orthodoxy	“dead,”	just	
as	the	Renaissance	had	labelled	the	Middle	Ages	“dark.”		
This	 labelling	 is	 most	 explicit	 in	 Armstrong’s	 characterisation	 of	 Protestant	
scholasticism.	 Apart	 from	 the	 tendency	 to	 “deductive	 ratiocination”	 we	 have	 already	
seen,	 Armstrong	 deems	 scholasticism	 to	 have	 “a	 pronounced	 interest	 in	metaphysical	
matters,	 in	 abstract,	 speculative	 thought.”	 Indeed,	 he	 holds	 that	 Calvin’s	 and	 Luther’s	
theology	 had	 been	 “overcome	 by	 the	 metaphysics	 and	 deductive	 logic	 of	 a	 restored	
Aristotelianism.”16	For	Armstrong,	metaphysics	is	therefore	associated	with	abstract	and	
speculative	 thought,	 and	 with	 an	 undesirable	 dominance	 of	 Aristotle’s	 philosophy	 in	
theological	literature.	
John	Patrick	Donnelly’s	Calvinism	and	Scholasticism	in	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Man	



















of	 Armstrong’s	 description	 of	 scholasticism	 can	 be	 clearly	 found	 in	 Vermigli,	 Donnelly	




“most	 important	 factor”	 for	 the	development	of	 this	scholasticism	was	“the	continued	
teaching	 of	 Aristotle	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 philosophical	 education,	 indeed	 of	 most	







he	 argues	 that	 Calvin’s	 polemics	 against	 scholastic	 theology	were	more	 nuanced	 than	













methodology.25	 In	 After	 Calvin,	 he	 extended	 this	 inquiry	 to	 the	 Development	 of	 the	





impressive	 array	 of	 sixteenth-century	 thinkers.	 Muller’s	 comments	 on	 or	 exegesis	 of	
Vermigli’s	work	are	 therefore	not	extensive,	but	nevertheless	 insightful.	He	essentially	
considers	 Vermigli	 to	 stand	 in	 the	 same	 relation	 to	 Calvin	 as	Melanchthon	 to	 Luther:	
“Reformed	 theology,	 in	 the	person	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	 received	much	 the	 same	






called	 a	 scholastic	 or	 humanist,	 or	 both.	 Joseph	 McLelland	 has	 argued	 that	 Vermigli	
“combines	‘humanism’	and	‘scholasticism’	in	a	positive	way,	so	that	he	is	less	the	villain	
than	 Armstrong	 thinks,	 and	 the	 more	 significant.”29	 By	 contrast,	 Marvin	 Anderson	
proposed	in	the	same	year	that	Vermigli	was	essentially	a	humanist,	which	–	he	asserted	
–	 could	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 “anti-scholastic	 bent	 of	Martyr’s	mind.”30	 This	 debate	 is	 so	
dependent	on	extremely	disputed	definitions	–	of	‘scholasticism’	and	‘humanism’	–	that	
it	 basically	 seems	 futile.	 Nevertheless,	 Frank	 A.	 James	 resumed	 the	 debate	 in	 1999,	
arguing	 that	 it	 was	 “Vermigli’s	 Augustinianism	 which	 provided	 the	 intellectual	 link	
																																																						
25	Richard	A.	Muller,	The	Unaccommodated	Calvin :	 Studies	 in	 the	Foundation	of	a	Theological	Tradition	
(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000).	




















Vermigli”	 is	of	 a	 “methodological	nature”	and	 that	 generally,	 “scholasticism”	 concerns	
“issues	of	method	rather	than	issues	of	theological	content.”34	By	contrast,	most	literary	
scholars	 and	historians	would	 take	 it	 for	 granted	 that	 a	 text’s	 content	 cannot	be	 fully	
understood	 in	abstraction	from	the	 literary	form	and	historical	context	 in	which	 it	was	






interrelatedness	 of	 various	 thinkers	 in	 their	 developments.	 Vermigli	 scholarship,	 by	
contrast,	is	still	largely	concerned	with	seemingly	static	labels	for	Vermigli’s	theology.	As	




31	 Frank	 A.	 James,	 “Peter	Martyr	 Vermigli:	 At	 the	 Crossroads	 of	 Late	Medieval	 Scholasticism,	 Christian	
Humanism	and	Resurgent	Augustinianism,”	in	Protestant	Scholasticism:	Essays	in	Reassessment,	ed.	Carl	R.	
Trueman	and	R.	Scott	Clark	(Carlisle:	Paternoster	Press,	1999),	62–78,	here	77.	












fresh	 insight	 into	nature	of	Vermigli’s	 theology.	Before	 turning	 to	an	exposition	of	my	




















influence	of	nominalism.	He	 refers	 to	a	number	of	Catholic	 theologians,	who	held	 the	






















their	 theology	 into	 a	 scholastic	 form,	 they	 rather	 consistently	 avoided	
nominalism	as	a	base.	Insofar	as	the	roots	of	Protestant	scholasticism	go	
back	 to	 the	Middle	 Ages,	 they	 tend	 to	 go	 back	 to	 the	 via	 antiqua	 and	
Thomism.	Protestant	fruit	grows	well	on	the	Thomist	tree,	even	better	than	
on	 the	 nominalist	 tree.	 In	 this	 light	 the	 intrinsic	 connections	 between	







“held	 to	 be	 true	 and	 necessary	 in	 virtue	 of	 Catholic	 tradition	 itself.”44	 Nevertheless,	
Bouyer	maintains,	these	principles	were	narrowed	and	turned	‘negative’	in	the	context	of	
polemical	 demarcations.	 For	 example,	 the	 Reformers	 famously	 affirmed	 that	 human	
salvation	depends	fully	on,	and	is	granted	through	God’s	abundant	grace,	sola	gratia.	This	
affirmation,	however,	was	eventually	associated	with	a	denial	of	any	human	contribution	


















church	 –	 the	 Reformation	 turned	 heretical,	 despite	 its	 genuinely	 Christian	 principles?	
Bouyer’s	answer	 to	 this	question	 is	 ‘nominalism’.	 The	Reformation’s	negations	are,	he	
holds,	 the	 offspring	 of	 an	 unholy	 alliance	 of	 Reformation	 thinking	 with	 nominalist	
metaphysics.	The	Reformers	unconsciously	inherited	a	nominalist	understanding	of	how	







more	 than	 a	 word	without	 content”48	 –	 which	 in	 turn	means	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 an	
ontological	difference	between	God	and	creation	becomes	unintelligible.	God	has	to	be	
thought	as	part	of	the	same	ontological	order	as	human	beings,	distinguished	from	them	
mainly	 through	 his	 power.49	 In	 these	 circumstances,	 whatever	 action	 God	 carries	 out	
cannot	and	must	not	be	carried	out	by	human	persons,	and	vice	versa.	Human	actions	can	
be	 seen	as	 taking	 something	away	 from	what	 is	 rightfully	God’s	 in	a	 kind	of	 zero-sum	
game.50	That	the	positive	affirmations	of	the	Reformation	were	entangled	with	negations,	
and	 often	 presupposed	 ultimately	 unhelpful	 dichotomies,	 for	 Bouyer,	 is	 owing	 to	 the	
























on	 the	 Reformers.	 This	 literature	 mostly	 enquires	 into	 direct	 influences	 of	 certain	
medieval	authors	on	Luther,	Calvin	and	others,	often	taking	explicit	references	in	the	work	
of	the	latter	as	their	starting	point.52	Such	a	method	is	certainly	valuable,	even	though	the	











52	 To	mention	only	 a	 few	 recent	 examples:	 Theodor	Dieter,	 “Luther	 as	 a	 Late	Medieval	 Theologian:	His	
Positive	 and	 Negative	 Use	 of	 Nominalism	 and	 Realism,”	 in	 The	 Oxford	 Handbook	 of	 Martin	 Luther’s	
Theology,	ed.	Robert	Kolb,	Irene	Dingel,	and	Lubomir	Batka	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	31–48;	
Mark	 C	 Mattes,	 “Luther’s	 Use	 of	 Philosophy,”	 Lutherjahrbuch	 80	 (2013):	 110–41;	 B	 J	 Van	 der	 Walt,	
“Philosophical	and	Theological	Influences	in	John	Calvin’s	Thought:	Reviewing	Some	Research	Results,”	In	
Die	Skriflig	44,	no.	3	(2010):	105–27.	
53	 Heiko	 A.	 Oberman,	 The	 Harvest	 of	 Medieval	 Theology:	 Gabriel	 Biel	 and	 Late	 Medieval	 Nominalism	




enquire	 into	 “the	 nature	 of	 the	 cause	 but	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 change.”54	 However,	





East	 and	 the	 West,	 holds	 that	 changing	 between	 different	 historical	 viewpoints	
(Blickwechsel)	helps	to	illuminate	a	certain	phenomenon	more	thoroughly	than	it	could	





medieval	 schools	 on	 the	 philosophical	 commitments	 of	 the	 Reformers	 concerns	 the	
difficulty	of	defining	some	of	 its	categories.	Especially	‘nominalism’	is	a	highly	disputed	
category,	 fraught	 with	 at	 least	 two	 conceptual	 and	 historiographical	 difficulties.	 First,	
nominalism	 is	 a	 notoriously	 under-defined	 term.	 This	 can	 be	 seen,	 for	 instance,	 in	
Bouyer’s	work,	where	he	seemingly	takes	it	to	be	a	self-explanatory	category.	The	only	




and	 given	 also	 that	 none	 of	 Ockham’s	 contemporaries	 would	 have	 called	 him	 a	
nominalist.57	It	is	moreover	contested	whether	and	how	nominalism	as	a	concept	reaches	
beyond	 epistemology	 into	 ontology.58	 Bouyer	 clearly	 assumes	 the	 latter,	 taking	 it	 for	
granted	that	the	univocity	of	being	is	a	characteristic	of	nominalism.59	All	of	this	suggests	
																																																						











that	 –	 in	 contrast	 to	Bouyer’s	 seemingly	 self-evident	 use	of	 the	 concept	 –	 defining	or	
understanding	nominalism	is	far	from	evident.60	
Secondly,	 and	 somewhat	 independently	 of	 how	 one	 wishes	 to	 understand	
nominalism,	it	is	not	clear	how	it	is	to	be	assessed	–	both	regarding	its	place	in	the	history	
of	theology	and	that	of	modernity.	As	we	have	seen	above,	Bouyer	assesses	‘nominalism’	




the	way.61	Others,	 by	 contrast,	wished	 to	 defend	 the	 ‘catholicity’	 of	 nominalism.62	 To	
make	matters	more	 complicated	 still,	 scholars	 of	 the	 history	 of	 ideas	 have	moreover	
repeatedly	 associated	 ‘nominalism’	 and	 the	 univocity	 of	 being	 with	 the	 genesis	 of	




modernity	 further	back	 than	Ockham	or	 ‘nominalism’.	André	de	Muralt,	 Jean-François	
Courtine,	Olivier	Boulnois	and	others	have	argued	that	Ockham	is	to	be	seen	as	part	of	a	
tradition	 which	 originated	 earlier,	 merely	 making	 more	 explicit	 certain	 metaphysical	
configurations	 which	 appeared	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 thirteenth	 century,	 most	
prominently	 in	 the	 work	 of	 John	 Duns	 Scotus.64	 The	 argument	 goes	 that	 these	
																																																						
60	This	is	moreover	highlighted	by	the	fact	that	scholars	have	only	recently	substantially	revisited	some	core	
concepts	 associated	with	 it,	 like	 God’s	 potentia	 absoluta	 and	 ordinata.	 See	William	 J.	 Courtenay,	 “The	





62	 Oberman,	 The	 Harvest	 of	 Medieval	 Theology:	 Gabriel	 Biel	 and	 Late	 Medieval	 Nominalism;	 Heiko	 A.	


























modernity.	 In	 contrast	 to	 Pickstock	 and	 Milbank,	 however,	 he	 welcomes	 the	
development.70	The	role	of	the	Reformation	in	this	genealogy	has	not	been	considered	so	















































insofar	 as	 I	 propose	 to	 consider	 the	 metaphysical	 framework(s)	 sustaining	 Vermigli’s	





and	 of	 causality	 constitute	 a	 useful	 heuristic	 lens	 through	which	 to	 read	 Reformation	
thought	with	a	view	for	understanding	its	implied	metaphysical	frameworks.	
Applying	this	lens	means	to	pose	the	following	question	to	any	author	or	body	of	





God’s	 being,	 and	 there	 are	 no	 pockets	 of	 reality	 where	 created	 beings	 stand	 or	 act	
autonomously.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 former,	 God’s	 being	 and	 the	 being	 of	 creation	 are	
envisaged	to	be	on	the	same	‘plane’.	Either	of	these	options	affect	the	way	in	which	the	








things	 God	 Himself	 is	 properly	 the	 cause	 of	 universal	 being	 which	 is	 innermost	 in	 all	
things,”	and	that	because	of	this	“in	all	things	God	works	intimately.”73	This	idea,	viz.	that	
God	 acts	 immediately	 in	 and	 through	 creatures,	 has	 also	 been	 described	 as	 a	 divine-
human	 synergy.	 However,	 this	 synergy	 was	 gradually	 challenged	 and	 replaced	 by	 a	
concept	 of	 God’s	 mediated	 concurrence:	 “actions	 of	 secondary	 causes	 are	 no	 longer	
described	under	the	aspect	of	their	dependence	on	the	first	cause,	but	under	the	aspect	




















Scotus’	 critique	of	Thomas	Aquinas’	position	mentioned	above.	 In	direct	opposition	 to	
Aquinas’	 teaching,	 that	 being	 is	 an	 effect	 of	 God,	 Scotus	 affirmed	 that	 since	 every	
composite	effect	can	be	generated	by	a	created	cause	only	by	passing	through	the	action	
of	creatures,	these	creatures	have	to	be	considered	themselves	“givers	of	being.”76	For	
Scotus,	 the	 first	cause	 therefore	no	 longer	has	any	ontological	priority	over	 the	action	
performed	by	the	secondary	cause;	rather	the	two	enjoy	a	being	that	can	be	described	
univocally.	 Almost	 two	 decades	 before	 Schmutz,	 André	 de	 Muralt	 highlighted	 the	
importance	of	 this	 seemingly	 small	move.77	 Its	 ramifications	 for	 the	various	models	of	
metaphysics	 as	 a	 discipline	 as	 developed	 in	 the	 Middle	 Ages	 have	 moreover	 been	
underlined	by	Olivier	Boulnois.78	
Nevertheless,	 the	 fact	 that	 Scotus	 and	 his	 heirs	 considered	 primary	 and	 the	
secondary	causes	to	operate	on	the	same	ontological	level	should	not	lead	us	to	conclude	
that	 they	 regarded	 the	 two	 orders	 as	 completely	 equal.	 The	 primacy	 of	 the	 divine	
influence	was	still	affirmed.	Similarly,	it	was	still	asserted	that	the	first	cause	produces	the	










between	 the	giving	 of	 being	 by	 the	 first	 cause,	 and	 its	 specification	 by	 the	 secondary	
																																																						
76	Cf.	John	Duns	Scotus,	Opus	oxoniense	IV,	dist.	1.	Q.	1	§	7.	
77	 André	 de	 Muralt,	 L’enjeu	 de	 la	 philosophie	 médiévale:	 études	 thomistes,	 scotistes,	 occamiennes	 et	











and	 universally	 accompanies	 every	 natural	 action,	 and	 the	 order	 of	 special	 influence,	




seen	as	 related	 to	 the	being	of	 the	 secondary	cause	 (so	 that	God	works	 in	 them),	but	
rather	as	concurring	with	them,	in	such	a	way	that	Divine	and	secondary	agency	both	work	
alongside	each	other,	contributing	different	but	seamless	elements	to	the	same	effect.		




































or	 there	 is	 no	 such	qualitative	difference,	 and	being	 is	 understood	univocally.	 Each	of	
these	alternatives	gives	rise	to	or	manifests	itself	in	a	different	metaphysical	framework.	
The	 former	 is	 a	 framework	where	 there	 are	 different	 intensities	 of	 being	 in	 a	 kind	 of	
hierarchy,	with	God’s	pre-eminent	being	at	the	top;	he	gives	being	to	everything	else,	and	
everything	else	in	turn	participates	in	him.	The	latter,	a	metaphysical	framework	based	on	
the	 univocity	 of	 being,	 knows	 no	 hierarchy	 of	 being,	 and	 does	 not	 conceive	 of	 the	
relationship	between	God	and	the	world	in	terms	of	participation.	In	such	a	framework,	
God	is	not	present	in	everything	through	its	very	being,	and	this	is	why	his	relationship	to	
the	world	 is	 framed	 not	 in	 ontological	 terms,	 but	 in	 terms	 of	 his	 ‘general’	 versus	 his	
‘special’	 influence,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 above,	 where	 he	 sustains	 everything	 generally	
through	his	power,	and	then	 ‘breaks	 in’	 for	special	deeds.	Historically,	a	 framework	of	
metaphysical	 participation	 has	 been	 associated	 with	 various	 forms	 of	 Christian	 Neo-
Platonism,	 whereas	 a	 univocal	 framework	 has	 been	 said	 by	 many	 to	 characterise	
modernity.85	However,	for	the	purpose	of	this	study,	I	wish	to	employ	the	slightly	stylised	
frameworks	just	described	as	a	heuristic	lens	through	which	to	study	the	metaphysics	of	
Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli.	 The	 historical	 nuances	 and	 backgrounds	 of	 each	 of	 them	 are	
therefore	 somewhat	 secondary.	 I	 will	 demonstrate	 how	 each	 of	 these	 metaphysical	
frameworks	 manifests	 itself	 in	 different	 conceptions	 of	 agency,	 gift,	 presence	 and	
authority.	The	chapters	of	this	study	will	focus	on	each	of	these	in	turn.		








whether	 it	 conceives	 of	 Divine	 being	 as	 transcendent	 and	 pre-eminent,	with	 all	 other	
being	participating	in	it.	These	two	basic	metaphysical	alternatives	manifest	themselves	
in	 different	 respective	 formulations	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 Divine	 and	 human	
agency,	the	character	of	Divine	gifts,	the	way	in	which	God	is	thought	to	be	present	in	the	
Church,	and	the	way	his	power	is	envisaged.	
It	 is	 the	 argument	 of	 each	 of	 the	 four	 chapters	 which	 follow,	 that	 Vermigli	







selected	 scholia	 from	 his	 Old	 Testament	 commentaries,	 Vermigli	 sometimes	 thinks	 of	









then	this	presupposes	a	 framework	of	metaphysical	participation.	The	same	 is	not	 the	
case	when	gifts	are	given	extrinsically.	I	demonstrate	that	Vermigli	holds	both	theses.	He	
insists	 that	 human	 beings	 can	 receive	 the	 gift	 of	 grace	 only	 extrinsically	 (through	
imputation),	while	he	equally	maintains	that	this	gift	transforms	them	intrinsically.		
Chapter	 three	 considers	 Vermigli	 at	 his	most	 polemical:	 in	 the	 debates	 on	 the	
Eucharist.	 I	 argue	 that	 in	 this	 context,	 Vermigli’s	 fundamental	 category	with	which	 to	








The	 fourth	 and	 final	 chapter	 argues	 that	 the	 two	 focal	 points	 of	 authority	 in	
Vermigli’s	political	theology	–	the	magistrate	and	the	word	of	God	–	do	not	function	in	the	




the	Word	of	God.	 In	 the	 case	of	his	Word,	Vermigli	maintains,	God’s	power	needs	no	
mediation.	This	denial	of	mediation	conveys	that	God	and	the	world	are	seen	on	the	same	
ontological	plane.		











with	what	he	would	call	metaphysical	 speculation	certainly	 falling	under	 this	verdict.86	
Some	might	therefore	say,	as	David	C.	Steinmetz	did	in	the	case	of	Calvin,	that	“historians	












argument,	namely	 that	genuinely	 ‘biblical’	or	 ‘theological’	 reflection	can	do	away	with	
metaphysics,	has	sometimes	been	made	in	theology,	especially	after	Adolf	von	Harnack’s	
thesis	of	an	‘undue’	Hellenization	of	Christianity.88	There	are	important	and	varied	voices	
who	have	 spoken	up	against	 this,	 and	 their	 arguments	 apply	mutatis	mutandis	 to	our	
study	as	well:	Hans	Boersma	has	held	that	most	of	the	Christian	Tradition	has	been	“quite	
conscious	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 a	 universally	 accessible,	 neutral	
ontology	[or	metaphysics]	separate	from	the	very	particular	convictions	of	the	Christian	
faith.”89	Together	with	others,90	he	has	therefore	called	for	more	conscious	attention	to	
the	 metaphysics	 implicit	 in	 contemporary	 (Protestant)	 theology,	 because	 theological	










even	 if	 one	 does	 limit	 one’s	 enquiry	 to	 such	 texts,	where	 they	 exist,	 the	metaphysics	

















the	 seventeenth	 century.	 He	 convincingly	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	
Reformed	metaphysical	treatises	of	the	second	half	of	the	sixteenth	and	the	seventeenth	
century	 did	 not	 subscribe	 to	 the	 univocity	 of	 being.	 He	 shows	 that	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	
positions	 was	 being	 held,	 from	 an	 explicitly	 analogical	 doctrine	 of	 the	 names	 of	 God	
(Zanchi,	Hyperius),	to	assertions	that	God	is	“supra	ens”	(Keckermann)	and	concomitant	


















True,	 they	 denied	 the	 univocity	 of	 being.	 This	 does	 not	 mean,	 however,	 that	 they	
																																																						





97	 ““Surtout,	 chez	 lui	 [Scot],	 la	 metaphysica	 transcendens	 est	 devenue	 une	 démarche	 antérieure	 et	





necessarily	 inhabited	 a	 metaphysics	 of	 participation.	 Quite	 to	 the	 contrary,	 their	
distinction	between	a	general	and	a	special	metaphysics	 indicates	 that	 they	were	very	
much	part	of	a	tradition	which	began	with	Scotus	and	culminated	in	Kant.		






metaphysical	 treatises,	 such	 as	 Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli.	 However,	 before	 starting	 our	
exegesis,	it	will	be	useful	to	touch	briefly	on	who	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	was,	on	what	and	




Much	 is	 known	 about	 Vermigli’s	 life,	 not	 least	 because	 of	 the	 work	 of	 Josiah	 Simler,	
Vermigli’s	successor	as	professor	of	Old	Testament	in	Zurich.	Simler	gave	the	eulogy	at	
Vermigli’s	funeral	and	later	expanded	and	published	it.98	More	recently,	Philip	McNair	has	
researched	the	 first	 forty-two	years	of	Vermigli’s	 life	 in	great	detail,	mostly	confirming	
Simler’s	 account.99	What	 follows	 is	 based	 on	 these	 two	 sources,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 other	
biographical	research	on	Vermigli’s	life.100	
																																																						







Political	 Theology	 (Leiden:	 Brill,	 2007),	 12–21;	 Joseph	 C.	 McLelland,	 “Italy:	 Religious	 and	 Intellectual	
Ferment,”	in	A	Companion	to	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	ed.	W.	J.	Torrance	Kirby,	Emidio	Campi,	and	Frank	A.	
James	(Leiden/Boston:	Brill,	2009),	25–33;	R.	Gerald	Hobbs,	“Strasbourg:	Vermigli	and	the	Senior	School,”	
in	A	 Companion	 to	 Peter	Martyr	 Vermigli,	 ed.	W.	 J.	 Torrance	 Kirby,	 Emidio	 Campi,	 and	 Frank	 A.	 James	
(Leiden/Boston:	Brill,	2009),	35–69;	Charlotte	Methuen,	“Oxford:	Reading	Scripture	in	the	University,”	in	A	
Companion	 to	 Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli,	 ed.	 W.	 J.	 Torrance	 Kirby,	 Emidio	 Campi,	 and	 Frank	 A.	 James	
(Leiden/Boston:	 Brill,	 2009),	 71–93;	 Emidio	 Campi,	 “Zurich:	 Professor	 in	 the	 Schola	 Tigurina,”	 in	 A	
Companion	 to	 Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli,	 ed.	 W.	 J.	 Torrance	 Kirby,	 Emidio	 Campi,	 and	 Frank	 A.	 James	









orthodox	 faith	 against	Manicheans	 in	 1252.	 Soon	 after,	 he	 went	 to	 the	 University	 of	
Padua,	where	he	was	immersed	in	studies	of	Greek	and	the	liberal	arts.	Around	1525	he	
was	ordained	to	the	priesthood,	before	being	elected	a	public	preacher	of	the	Lateran	
Congregation.	 This	 led	 him	 to	 travel	 all	 over	 Italy.	 Being	 required	 to	 preach	 on	 the	
scriptures	of	both	Testaments,	 he	 applied	himself	 to	 the	 study	of	Hebrew,	 aided	by	 a	
Jewish	physician.	In	1530,	he	was	appointed	Deputy	Prior	of	his	order	of	S.	Giovanni	in	











on	 these	 lectures,	 he	 later	 published	 commentaries	 to	 the	 books	 of	 Genesis	 and	
Lamentations.		
In	Strasbourg	Vermigli	moreover	met	Catherine	Dammartin,	a	 former	nun	from	








the	 reform	had	grown	 to	 such	an	extent	 that	both	he	and	his	host	Bucer	were	 jointly	
invited	by	King	Edward	VI	through	the	offices	of	Archbishop	Thomas	Cranmer	to	take	up	
senior	 positions	 at	 Oxford	 and	 Cambridge	 respectively.	 Both	 were	 appointed	 to	 the	
prestigious	Regius	chairs	in	Divinity.	





1549	became	an	event	of	national	 significance,	and	Vermigli	was	 formally	declared	 its	
winner.	He	continued	his	teaching	in	Oxford	by	lecturing	on	Romans,	from	which	would	
eventually	 ensue	his	Romans	 commentary.	Vermigli	 counselled	Cranmer	on	 important	
aspects	of	the	1552	Book	of	Common	Prayer,	and	was	also	made	part	of	the	working	group	
which	was	 to	 revise	 the	Canon	Law	of	England.	Together	with	 the	Oxford	disputation,	
these	are	perhaps	the	most	important	theological	contributions	Vermigli	made	during	his	
time	on	the	British	Isles.		
Vermigli’s	wife	 Catherine	 died	 after	 eight	 years	 of	marriage	 and	was	 buried	 in	
Oxford.	Her	 remains	 subsequently	 became	 subject	 of	 confessional	 animosities.	 During	
Mary’s	reign,	Cardinal	Pole	had	her	body	exhumed	and	cast	on	a	dung	heap.	After	1558,	








on	Cranmer’s	behalf	 to	Stephen	Gardiner’s	attack	on	 the	Archbishop’s	Treatise	on	 the	
Lord’s	 Supper.	 But	 even	 within	 Strasbourg,	 there	 were	 now	 quarrels	 about	 how	 to	






for	 even	 though	 he	 was	 invited	 by	 Calvin	 to	 take	 up	 an	 appointment	 at	 the	 Geneva	
Academy,	and	by	Elizabeth	I	to	return	to	his	Regius	Chair	at	Oxford,	he	declined.		
During	 these	 years	 in	 Zurich,	 he	 lectured	 on	 the	 books	 of	 Samuel	 and	 Kings	 –	
lectures	which	were	posthumously	published	as	commentaries.	He	also	married	a	second	
time:	 Catharina	 Merenda,	 a	 young	 Italian	 lady	 from	 a	 wealthy	 family	 who	 –	 being	 a	
Protestant	–	had	lived	in	the	Genevan	exile	before.	In	the	three	years	of	their	marriage,	
Catharina	bore	Vermigli	 three	 children,	 two	of	which	died	as	 infants.	 The	 third,	Maria	
Vermilia,	was	born	only	after	the	death	of	her	father,	and	was	Vermigli’s	only	surviving	
offspring.	
	Vermigli	 represented	 the	 Zurich	 church	 at	 the	 Colloquy	 of	 Poissy	 in	 1561,	
convoked	by	Catherine	de	Medici,	the	regent	of	France,	in	the	hope	of	bringing	about	a	
peaceful	resolution	to	the	religious	differences	 in	France.	 In	the	key	disputation	of	the	
Colloquy,	 once	 again	 concerning	 the	 Eucharist,	 Vermigli	 took	 the	 lead	 among	 the	
Protestant	 representatives.	 The	 Colloquy	 did	 not	 reach	 its	 intended	 result,	 and	 after	
returning	 to	 Zurich,	Vermigli’s	health	 started	 to	deteriorate.	He	died	on	12	November	
1562	and	was	buried	in	the	cloister	of	the	Grossmünster.	





















and	 Heidelberg.	 The	 final	 printing	 came	 at	 Amsterdam	 in	 1656.104	 In	 his	 Epistola	
Nuncupatoria	of	the	first	edition	of	the	Loci,	Masson	writes	that	Vermigli	was	not	averse	







desire	 for	 systematic	 development	 that	 was	 impossible	 in	 his	 usual	 line-by-line	
exegesis.107	Like	Luther,	Vermigli	thought	that	the	text	of	the	Scriptures	should	replace	
Lombard’s	Sentences	or	the	various	Summae	as	the	prime	source	from	which	theology	
should	 be	 taught.	 Yet,	 as	Donnelly	 puts	 it,	 Vermigli’s	 “introduction	 of	 the	 scholia,	 the	
massive	interjection	of	systematic	theological	tracts	into	the	exegesis	of	the	biblical	text,	
																																																						
102	Christoph	Strohm	has	analysed	 the	 similarities	 in	great	detail.	 See	Christoph	Strohm,	 “Petrus	Martyr	
Vermiglis	Loci	Communes	und	Calvins	Institutio	Christianae	Religionis,”	in	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli:	Humanism,	
Republicanism,	Reformation,	ed.	Emidio	Campi	(Genève:	Droz,	2002),	77–104.	The	argument	has	been	made	
that	Calvin’s	 Institutes	 themselves	are	a	compilation	of	 theological	 loci	and	disputationes,	which	goes	to	
show	the	prevalence	of	this	form,	cf.	Elsie	Anne	McKee	and	Brian	G.	Armstrong,	“Exegesis,	Theology,	and	


















was	basically	 subversive	of	Luther’s	program	for	 theological	education.”108	 Indeed,	 the	
scholia	essentially	amount	to	“an	implicit	confession	that	the	theological	process	must	go	
beyond	 an	 exposition	 of	 the	 Bible	 text.”109	 They	 manifest	 both	 Vermigli’s	 desire	 for	
systematic	exposition	of	theological	questions	raised	by	the	text	of	the	Scriptures,	and	his	
wish	 to	 give	 his	 lectures	 greater	 relevance	 to	 the	 ministerial	 students	 before	 him.	
Especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 his	Old	 Testament	 commentaries,	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 case.	



























set	of	 texts	of	his	oeuvre	–	 in	contrast	 to	the	three	following	chapters.	 Instead,	 I	have	
chosen	to	focus	mainly	on	two	of	his	commentaries,	namely	on	the	books	of	Samuel,	and	
on	 Aristotle’s	 Nicomachean	 Ethics.1	 They	 both	 stem	 from	 lectures	 delivered	 late	 in	
Vermigli’s	life	(between	1553	and	1558).	From	the	Samuel	commentary,	we	will	focus	on	
two	 kinds	 of	 scholia:	 Vermigli’s	 reflections	 on	 providence,	 and	 his	 comments	 on	 the	
question	 of	 how	 God	 is	 –	 or	 rather,	 is	 not	 –	 implicated	 in	 sinful	 actions.	 Both	 these	
theological	 loci	 are	 pertinent	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Vermigli	 believes	 God	 to	 work	 in	
creatures,	and	how	human	and	Divine	agency	relate.	The	Ethics	commentary	lends	itself	










1	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	 In	duos	 libros	Samuelis	prophetae	qui	 vulgo	priores	 libri	Regum	appellantur	 ...	
commentarii	...	(Zurich:	Froschauer,	1564);	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	In	primum,	secundum,	et	initium	tertii	
libri	Ethiocorum	Aristotelis	ad	Nicomachum	...	commentarius	(Zurich:	Froschauer,	1563).	
2	 Pietro	Martire	 Vermigli,	Melachim,	 id	 est,	 Regum	 libri	 duo	 posteriores	 cum	 Commentariis	 (Zurich:	 Ch.	
Froschauer,	1566).	














after	 his	 death,	 that	 they	 were	 printed.5	 Vermigli’s	 former	 colleagues	 in	 Zurich	 had	








the	giver	of	existence	 is	present	with	 the	creature’s	actions	 insofar	as	 they	exist;	or	 is	
God’s	 influence	seen	as	concurring	with	human	actions,	 in	such	a	way	that	Divine	and	






















of	 complex	 causalities.	 As	 we	 shall	 see,	 Vermigli’s	 notion	 of	 providence	 implies	 a	
relationship	between	God	and	creation	which	is	determined	ontologically,	and	is	based	































how	 he	 is	 creating,	 Vermigli	 argues.	 Indeed,	 “the	 heavenly	 spheres,	 the	 stars,	 the	













God’s	 agency	 in	 the	world	 through	providence	 is	 all-encompassing.	Nothing	 is	 outside	
providence,	 for	Vermigli,	 precisely	 because	 there	 is	 nothing	 that	 is	 not	 created.	God’s	
governing	 providence	 applies	 undiscriminatingly	 to	 all	 of	God’s	 creation;	 there	 are	 no	
spheres	 to	 which	 it	 applies	 less	 intensely	 than	 to	 others.	 Secondly,	 this	 connection	
between	 creation	 and	 providence	 indicates	 that	 everything,	 by	 its	 very	 being,	 is	
dependent	on	God.	Put	differently,	this	means	that	there	is	an	ontological	dependence	of	




















things,	 it	 is	 nothing	 else	 but	 supplying	 that	 common	 influence	 which	
everything	draws	into	itself.	This	makes	God	the	ruler	and	governor	of	the	
universe	not	 in	reality	but	 in	name	only.	 If	everything	bends	and	applies	
that	common	influence	of	God	in	its	own	way,	then	God	follows	the	nature	
of	created	things.15	







insofar	 as	 it	 touches	 salvation.16)	 Therefore,	 according	 to	 Vermigli’s	 doctrine	 of	
providence,	 God’s	 influence	must	 be	 envisaged	 as	more	 intimate	 than	 by	means	 of	 a	
general	 influence,	 which	 can	 be	 inflected	 and	 potentially	 overcome	 by	 the	 creatures	
receiving	it.	This	indicates	that	Vermigli	envisages	an	influence	of	God	that	is	stronger	than	










accommodet	 ad	 se	 commune	 illum	 influxum	 Dei,	 Deus	 squitur	 naturam	 rerum	 creatarum.”	 (Vermigli,	
Samuelis,	57r;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	186.)		
16	On	Vermigli’s	doctrine	of	predestination,	see	Pietro	Martire	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	 Justification:	
Two	 Theological	 Loci,	 ed.	 Frank	A.	 James	 (Kirksville	MO:	 Truman	 State	University	 Press,	 2003);	 Joachim	
Staedtke,	“Der	Zürcher	Prädestinationsstreit	von	1560,”	Zwingliana	9	(1949):	536–46;	James,	Peter	Martyr	






This	question	 is	 intimately	 connected	 to	 the	doctrine	of	providence,	as	 it	 seems	 to	be	
raised	as	an	objection	against	it.	For	if	God’s	providence	governs	everything	in	the	way	we	











but	 also	 flows	 from	God,	 the	 first	 efficient	 cause.	 Still,	 God	 causes	 each	 object	 to	 act	
according	to	its	nature	and	preserves	the	integrity	of	secondary	causes:	“But	even	though	
































human	 beings	 to	 which	 we	 will	 return	 in	 the	 next	 section.	 He	 believes	 that	 in	 their	
depravity,	human	beings	have	a	propensity	‘automatically’	to	do	the	wrong	thing,	unless	


















hominum,	 qui	 cum	 sint	 arbores	malae,	 non	 possunt	 bonos	 fructus	 facere.	 Deus	 autem	 suprema	 causa	



















































Baschera	 and	 Christian	 Moser	 have	 shown,	 quite	 unique	 among	 early	 modern	
commentaries	of	the	Ethics.28		











The	 metaphorical	 comparison	 of	 human	 beings	 and	 poisoned	 vessels	 is	 telling.	 The	
theological	background	for	this	is	Vermigli’s	belief	in	the	“corruption	and	ruin	caused	by	













corrumpimus.”	 (Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 466–67;	 Vermigli,	 Commentary	 on	
Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	319.)	













even	 those	 who	 are	 united	 with	 Christ	 are	 not	 entirely	 ‘pure’	 vessels	 (to	 remain	 in	
Vermigli’s	 metaphor),	 even	more	 so	 must	 those	 who	 are	 still	 in	 their	 fallen	 state	 be	
‘poisoned’.	 It	 is	 important	 to	note,	however,	 that	 the	metaphor	equally	 indicates	 that	
whatever	is	poured	into	fallen	human	beings	is	good	per	se,	like	the	wine	that	is	not	in	
itself	poisonous.	Rather,	its	goodness	is	destroyed	when	entering	the	corrupt	vessels.		





mind	 through	 the	 kindness	 of	 God.	 Hence	 we	 are	 able	 to	 concede	
synderesis,	which	 is	 simply	 the	preservation	of	 that	 knowledge.	We	will	









34	 “Reatus	 enim,	 et	 offensa	Dei	 per	 fidem	 in	Christum	 in	baptismo	 condonatur,	 quamvis	 adhuc	materia	









The	 first	 thing	 to	note	here	 is	 Vermigli’s	 positive	 evaluation	of	 the	 capacity	 of	 human	
reason	 even	 in	 fallen	 human	 beings.	 He	 concedes	 that	 knowledge	 of	 honest	 things	
remains	 in	 the	 fallen	human	mind	and	hence	accepts	 the	 idea	of	synderesis,	 a	natural	
capacity	to	apprehend	the	first	principles	of	human	action.	All	these	things	are	good	by	
nature	[natura	suae	sint	bonae	res]	he	maintains.	It	is	the	effect	of	the	Fall	which	turns	
them	 into	 ‘sins’	 in	 the	 ‘unregenerate’.	Vermigli’s	argument	 is	 that	 reason	and	“honest	
things”	remain	good	by	nature,	but	that	they	are	somehow	robbed	of	their	strength	in	
those	 under	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 Fall:	 honest	 affections	 are	 “quite	 weak	 because	 [the	
















they	 can	only	 accept	 them	by	 thwarting	 them.	God	 therefore	 does	 not	 act	 directly	 in	
actions	 performed	 through	 the	 reason	 or	 affections	 of	 the	 ‘unregenerate’.	 The	 good	
reason	or	affection	which	God	offers	constitutes	only	one	element	of	a	‘compound’	action.	
																																																						













within	 the	 metaphor,	 once	 the	 vessel	 of	 the	 human	 soul	 is	 no	 longer	 thought	 to	 be	
(entirely)	poisonous,	when	it	has	become	united	with	Christ,	God	works	in	it	differently	
than	he	did	before.	It	will	be	the	task	of	Chapter	Two	to	expound	Vermigli’s	theology	of	











destined	 to	be	worthy	may	persevere	 in	 just	 actions.”39	 Those	who	are	 ‘destined’	will	






and	 by	 their	 command,	we	 are	moved	 to	 these	 actions,”	 actions	 of	 self-denial	 in	 the	
																																																						
39	“Neque	illud	recipimus,	virtutem	moralem	usu	atque	consuetudine	acquiri.	Deus	hic	praeteritur,	qui	est	




















What	 are	 we	 to	 infer	 from	 this	 tension?	 Does	 it	 indicate	 different	 stages	 of	
Vermigli’s	thinking?	Or	does	it	flow	from	different	rhetorical	contexts?	The	latter	seems	
unlikely	 because	 both	 the	 Samuel	 commentary	 and	 the	 Ethics	 commentary	 were	
delivered	in	fairly	similar	settings,	to	an	audience	of	future	ministers.	As	for	whether	it	
represents	a	development	in	Vermigli’s	thinking,	I	will	argue	that	this	is	not	the	case	either,	
because	 there	 are	 elements	 in	 the	 Ethics	 commentary	 itself	 which	 imply	 the	 unified	
framework	which	we	have	seen	in	the	Samuel	commentary.	Let	us	focus	on	two	examples	
from	 Vermigli’s	 commentary	 on	 the	Nicomachean	 Ethics	 in	 particular,	 both	 of	 which	
assume	a	unified	metaphysical	framework	of	ontological	dependence	of	all	of	creation	on	
the	Creator.		







41	 “Fatemur	 principium,	 quo	 nostrae	 voluntates	 mutantur,	 extrinsecum	 esse.	 At	 nostrae	 voluntates	
immutatae	a	Spiritu	Dei	nobis	intrinsecae	sunt	et	illarum	iussu	ad	istas	actiones	movemur,	ideo	voluntariae	
dici	 debent.	 Non	 enim	 a	 Deo	 sine	 nobis	 fiunt.”	 (Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 577;	
Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	397.)	




produces	 everything	 and	 is	 prompted	 by	 no	 other	 reason	 than	 his	 own	
goodness.	…	And	all	things	not	only	owe	their	creation	to	God	but	also	tend	
toward	 him	 as	 to	 their	 ultimate	 goal.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 no	 wonder	 that	
everything	is	related	to	him,	since	the	perfection	of	all	things	depends	on	
him.	 Plato	 understood	 and	 explained	 in	 his	 writings	 very	 clearly	 those	
aspects	of	God’s	nature	that	 I	have	 just	 reviewed	as	well	as	many	other	
concepts.	The	same	concepts	are	contained	both	in	holy	scripture	and	in	
ancient	ecclesiastical	writers.43	
While	 this	 is	 not	 Vermigli’s	 own	 elaboration	 on	 the	 doctrine	 of	 God,	 but	 rather	 his	
theological	 reading	 of	 Plato,	 he	 clearly	 indicates	 that	 he	 approved	 of	 everything	 he	



















perfectio.	Haec,	quae	 recensui	et	alia	 complura	de	Deo	praeclarissime	 sensit	et	 scripsit.	Quae	partim	 in	
divinis	literis	habentur	expressa,	partim	vero	sunt	usurpata	ab	ecclesiasticis	scriptoribus	et	quidem	vetustis.”	
(Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	 Nikomachischen	 Ethik,	 218–19;	 Vermigli,	 Commentary	 on	 Aristotle’s	
Nicomachean	Ethics,	136–37.)	
44	“Ex	patribus	nostrae	religionis,	qui	iudicarunt	ideas	concedendas,	ut	fecit	Augustinus,	illas	non	induxisse,	











which	 he	 believes	 to	 be	 biblical,	 is	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 it	 assumes	 an	 ontological	
dependence	of	all	of	creation	on	the	Creator,	without	mentioning	any	dichotomy	between	
before	and	after	regeneration.	“All	things”	were	created	by	God,	and	tend	toward	him	as	





of	 creation	 that	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 twist	 God’s	 work	 as	 its	 efficient	 and	 final	 cause.	
Consequently,	all	of	the	foregoing	points	to	a	framework	of	metaphysical	participation,	















46	 “Eas	 [ideas]	 vero	 si	 naturam	 aut	 essentiam	 Dei	 dixisset,	 iure	 reprehendi	 non	 posset,	 sed	 eo	 tantum	
traducitur,	quod	eas	disiunctas	a	rebus	affirmarit,	nec	plane	disserverit,	ut	christiani	patres	explicuerunt,	







very	 pursuit	 of	 and	 desire	 for	 goodness;	 if	 creatures	 strive	 towards	 some	 good,	 they	




God	 is	 the	 author	 and	 ruler	 of	 nature,	 for	 he	 is	 perfectly	 conscious	 of	
whatever	 ends	 he	 wishes	 all	 things	 to	 tend	 toward.	 When	 in	 his	 own	
consciousness	 he	 prescribed	 a	 given	 end,	 he	 added	 inclinations	 and	
properties	by	which	all	things	are	enticed	toward	their	own	proper	end.48	




From	 these	 two	 examples,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 the	 tension	 which	 we	 have	






















So	 far,	 we	 have	 been	 focussing	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 God’s	 influence	 on	 his	 creation	 in	




















in	 Zurich	 between	mid-1556	 and	mid-1558.50	 This	 scholium,	 as	 Joseph	McLelland	 has	













resurrection	 of	 the	 body	 “which	 are	 natural	 and	 conclusive,”	 Vermigli	 concludes	 that	


























inquam,	 quandoquidem	 res	 ipsa	 totam	 vim	 naturae	 superat,	 rationes	 huius	 generis	 haberi	 non	
posse.”(Vermigli,	Melachim,	217r;	Vermigli,	Philosophical	Works,	58.)	

























the	 assumption	 that	 philosophical	 knowledge	 is	 acquired	 independently	 of	 God’s	
immediate	 influence.	 Once	 he	 has	 bestowed	 the	 means	 for	 it,	 viz.	 the	 capacity	 for	
























righteousness	 that	 God	 implanted	 naturally	 in	 human	 minds,	 it	 cannot	
therefore	rightly	be	criticised:	for	 it	 is	the	work	of	God	and	could	not	be	
enjoyed	by	us	without	his	special	contribution.59	




special	gift.	 Is	 it,	after	all,	 that	human	beings	reach	philosophical	 insights	due	to	God’s	
influentia	 specialis?	 If	 so,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 philosophical	 insight	 is	 to	 some	 degree	
‘revealed’,	too.	
This	 means	 that	 Vermigli	 does	 not	 maintain	 throughout	 the	 hard	 boundary	



























is	 the	 case	 in	 the	 comparable	 expressions	 from	 the	Ethics	 commentary	we	have	 seen	
above	–	especially	 the	concept	of	 the	God-given	seeds	“which	are	 the	principles	of	all	
knowledge”	 and	 the	 “justice	 and	 righteousness	 that	 God	 planted	 naturally	 in	 human	
minds.”	As	their	creator	and	sustainer,	God	is	also	the	source	of	all	inchoate	or	potential	


















We	 should	 understand	 that	 knowledge	 of	 God	 is	 of	 two	 kinds.	 One	 is	
effectual,	by	which	we	are	so	changed	that	we	try	to	express	what	we	know	
																																																						
atque	 eximia	 de	 natura	 Dei.	 Atque	 haec	 notitiae	 de	 Deo	 nobis	 naturaliter	 insitae	 observatione	 rerum	
creatarum	in	dies	magis	ac	magis	confirmantur	et	expoliuntur.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	29.)	















the	difference	arises	 from	the	ways	and	means	by	which	 it	 is	perceived.	
Natural	strength	is	corrupt,	weakened	and	defiled	through	sin,	so	that	the	





















provenit	 quo	 illa	 perciptur.	 Vires	 naturae	 corruptae	 sunt,	 infirmae	 ac	 vitiatae	 per	 peccatum.	 Ideoque	
veritatem	quam	apprehendunt	non	habent	efficacem.	At	fides	coniunctum	habet	divinum	afflatum	et	vim	
spiritus	sancti.	 Ideo	efficaciter	verum	apprehendit.	Diversitas	ergo	non	est	 in	 ipsa	veritate,	sed	 in	medio	
atque	instrumento	quo	illam	amplectimur.”	(Ibid.,	27.)	











disconnected,	 is	 however,	 implicitly	 challenged	 by	 other	 statements	 of	 his,	 which	
presuppose	 an	 inherent	 connection	 between	 all	 truth,	 and	 stress	 God	 as	 being	 its	
universal	origin.	The	coexistence	of	both	these	models,	is	indicative,	as	I	have	argued,	of	
a	non-unified	metaphysics.	Moreover,	one	strategy	by	which	Vermigli	attempted	to	hold	






inadequate,	 is	 real	 knowledge.”67	 Grabill	 moreover	 states	 that	 Vermigli	 gives	 an	

















arguably	 leads	 to	a	different	 theological	appreciation	of	nature.	For	 in	 the	case	of	 the	
former	model,	 nature	by	 itself,	with	merely	 the	 general	 help	of	God,	 is	marked	by	 its	
fallenness.	While	it	is	not	entirely	devoid	of	God	because	he	sustains	it	with	his	general	
influence,	it	is	nevertheless	able	to	twist	God’s	influence	because	this	influence	is	seen	as	
extrinsic	 and	 non-ontological.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 more	 unified	 ontological	 model	 of	
influence,	 however,	 there	 is	 nothing	 which	 is	 not	 dependent	 on	 God	 in	 such	 a	
fundamental	way	that	it	also	refers	to	God.	This	opens	the	possibility	for	a	much	more	











The	 subject	matter	of	 this	 chapter	has	been	 the	 interplay	between	Divine	and	human	
agency	as	envisaged	by	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli.	We	have	approached	this	topic	through	
two	 kinds	 of	 Vermigli’s	 commentaries	 (biblical	 and	 Aristotelian)	 and	 from	 two	
perspectives.	The	two	perspectives	were	(1)	God’s	influence	in	the	world	in	general,	and	




insight	 to	 be	 governed	 by	 a	 two-step-process.	 In	 the	 first	 of	 these	 steps,	 Vermigli	













even	 in	 one	 and	 the	 same	 context	 (viz.	 his	 Ethics	 commentary)	 indicates	 that	 the	
metaphysical	 framework	 implicitly	 sustaining	Vermigli’s	 thought	 is	 not	uniform.	As	we	
have	 seen,	 the	 two-tier	 processes	 suggest	 that	 God’s	 influence	 in	 the	 world	 is	 not	
determined	by	a	qualitative	difference	between	his	and	the	world’s	being.	This	is	because	
God’s	influence	could	not	be	considered	merely	general	if	it	was	an	ontological	influence,	
















the	 transcendent	 Creator	 of	 all	 things,	 whereas	 its	 recipients	 are	 created	 beings.	 The	
question	is	how	this	fundamental	dissimilarity	between	the	donor	and	the	beneficiaries	
affects	the	condition	of	the	possibility	of	the	gift,	both	with	regard	to	the	possibility	of	
God	 bestowing	 the	 gift	 of	 grace,	 and	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 human	 beings	 receiving	 it.	




which	 we	 have	 encountered	 in	 the	 first	 chapter,	 God’s	 bestowal	 of	 grace	 can	 be	
conceptualised	in	two	ways:	God	works	either	in	or	alongside	human	beings.	Each	of	these	
two	 alternatives	 is	 indicative	 of	 a	 different	 way	 to	 conceive	 of	 the	 metaphysical	
relationship	between	God	and	the	world.		
In	the	first	case,	God	is	seen	to	work	through	his	grace	in	human	beings	(and	the	
world	at	 large).	His	gift	 touches	the	very	being	of	 those	who	receive	 it,	affecting	them	
from	the	inside,	as	it	were.	The	gift	therefore	is	ontological	in	character.	However,	this	is	


















the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 bestowal	 of	 grace	 are	 detached	 from	 an	
ontological	 dependence	 of	 creatures	 on	 God,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 suppose	 a	









sections	 is	mainly	descriptive.	 The	goal	of	 this	exposition	 is	 to	prepare	 the	ground	 for	
section	three,	where	 I	will	consider	 the	aporetic	element	 in	Vermigli’s	 teaching	on	the	
workings	of	grace.	As	we	shall	see,	Vermigli’s	conception	of	the	believer’s	“mystical	union”	
with	Christ,	when	 taken	 together	with	his	writings	 about	 justification,	 reveals	 that	 for	
Vermigli	the	crucial	moment	of	change	in	the	believer’s	status	is	aporetic.	This	is	because	
the	nature	or	character	of	this	change	seems	to	be	simultaneously	extrinsic	and	intrinsic.	






commentaries	on	 the	book	of	Genesis,	 Paul’s	 first	 letter	 to	 the	Corinthians	 and	Paul’s	
Chapter	Two:	Gift	
	 60	
letter	 to	 the	 Romans.1	 As	we	 shall	 see,	 Vermigli	 distinguishes	 three	 senses	 of	what	 it	
means	for	God	to	bestow	grace	upon	the	believer,	or	“to	justify”	him,	in	each	of	these	
scholia.	In	what	follows,	I	will	present	the	scholia	one	by	one,	focussing	on	the	contours	



















the	 argument	 that	 Vermigli’s	 doctrine	 of	 justification	 is	 “lacking	 full	 Protestant	
																																																						
1	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli,	In	primum	librum	Mosis,	qui	volgo	Genesis	dicitur	commentarii	doctissimi	(Zürich:	


















discussing	 his	 three	 main	 source	 texts,	 first	 enquires	 about	 the	 texts’	 Protestant	
‘credentials’,	before	guiding	his	readers	through	their	actual	content.	James’s	assertion	
that	Vermigli	conceived	of	justification	in	forensic	terms	is	in	continuation	with	the	fact	
that	 he	 sees	 Vermigli	 as	 a	 “major	 Reformed	 theologian”5	 and	 that	 for	 him,	 being	
‘Protestant’	 (and	 especially	 ‘Reformed’)	 includes	 an	 affirmation	 of	 the	 purely	 forensic	
nature	of	justification.	The	methodological	difficulty	with	this	approach	is	that	it	measures	




























eternal	 life.	 The	 second	 is	 to	 do	 good	 deeds	 and	 live	 rightly.	 From	 the	
frequent	 practice	 of	 these	 holy	 actions	 various	 most	 noble	 habits	 are	








sins	 against	 them10	 –	 as	 when	 Israel’s	 judges	 declared	 someone	 to	 be	 just,	 thereby	
absolving	 them	 from	 their	 wrongdoing.11	 (It	 is	 worth	 noting,	 however,	 that	 in	 the	




itself	 in	 a	 holy	 life.	 Vermigli	 specifies	 therefore	 that	 “to	 justify	 sometimes	 also	means	




judge;	 rather,	 it	 involves	 the	 beneficiaries	 themselves	 becoming	 holy,	 and	 acting	


























returns	once	again	to	the	three	dimensions	of	God’s	bestowal	of	grace.	That	 it	 is	 faith	


































their	 trust	 in	 the	power	and	excellence	of	 their	own	assent.	The	 latter	would	mean	to	
depend	 on	 one’s	 own	 powers	 and	 reason,	 which	 are	 so	 ridden	 with	 infirmities	 and	
temptations	that	one	“can	never	be	sure	that	it	has	everything	which	God	demands.”18		
This	passage	not	only	 testifies	 to	Vermigli’s	keen	awareness	of	 the	danger	 that	
faith	may	be	misunderstood	as	a	second-level	‘work’,	but	it	also	indicates	one	of	his	main	
concerns	 throughout:	 the	 conviction	 that	 no	 human	 act	 can	 ultimately	 satisfy	 God’s	
demands.	This	 is	particularly	evident	 in	his	 concluding	discussion	on	 the	nature	of	 the	
“second”	righteousness.	Here	Vermigli	stresses	that	believers	should	not	think	that	they	
can	subsist	in	the	divine	judgement	because	they	have	led	a	virtuous	life	of	holy	and	noble	







































As	 in	 the	 Genesis	 scholium,	 here	 Vermigli	 also	 distinguishes	 three	 different	
semantic	aspects	of	what	it	means	for	God	to	confer	his	righteousness.	The	first	aspect	is	
again	related	to	the	activity	of	the	judges	in	the	Old	Testament	who	were	commanded	to	





























on	 God’s	 rewards	 to	 the	 faithful,	 even	 though	 Vermigli	 still	 mentions	 them	 in	 the	
conclusion	of	 the	 scholium	 (expressing	 the	 same	ambivalence	 towards	 the	 concept	 as	
noted	above27).	Instead,	Vermigli	now	suggests	that	this	aspect	of	righteousness	consists	
in	a	righteousness	inherent	to	the	soul	of	the	righteous,	from	the	habit	of	good	works.28		



















good	 life.”	 /	 “Et	 bonis	 operibus	 fidelium	 non	 inficiamur	 permulta	 praemia	 reddi,	 cum	 spiritualia	 tum	
temporalia.	Tantum	vitam	aeternam	licet	repromittatur	bene	viventibus	omnino	gratis	dari	contendimus.”	
(Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	38v;	Donnelly,	James,	and	McLelland,	The	Peter	Martyr	Reader,	149–50.)	









a	 human	 action,	 for	 “the	 source	 of	 justification	 comes	 from	 Christ,	 through	 God’s	
promises	and	mercy.”31		
THE	ROMANS	SCHOLIUM	
The	 third	 and	 final	 treatise	 on	 justification	 penned	 by	 Peter	Martyr	 forms	 part	 of	 his	
Romans	 commentary.	 This	 commentary	 dates	 from	 his	 time	 as	 Regius	 Professor	 of	
Theology	 in	 Oxford,	 where	 he	 lectured	 on	 the	 letter	 to	 the	 Romans	 in	 1550.	 After	
concluding	his	exposition	of	the	first	eleven	chapters	of	the	letter	to	the	Romans,	Vermigli	
chooses	 to	 “treat	 the	 topic	 of	 justification,”	 elaborating	 on	 the	 question:	 “are	 men	
justified	by	works	or	by	faith?”32	This	scholium,	when	compared	with	the	other	two,	 is	
significantly	more	polemical	in	tone.	Vermigli	openly	addresses	the	following	three	main	
opponents:	 Richard	 Smith,	 his	 Catholic	 predecessor	 in	Oxford;	 33	 the	Dutchman	Albert	
Pighius,	 in	 whom	 Vermigli	 sees	 one	 of	 the	 best	 defenders	 of	 the	 Catholic	 position,	
especially	because	he	tends	to	defend	it	on	the	basis	of	Scripture;34	and,	finally,	the	fathers	




impartiendo.	 Occurrit	 deinde	 Christus,	 qui	 nobis	 hanc	 dei	 misericordiam	 et	 salutis	 promissionem	
commeritus	 est,	 dum	pro	 nobis	 poenas	 tulit,	 quas	 ipsi	 eramus	 perpessuri.	 Succedit	 fides	 tertio	 loco,	 ut	
organum	 et	 instrumentum	 quo	 Christum	 percipimus	 et	 pariter	 cum	 eo	 dei	misericordiam	 salutaresque	
promissiones	unde	iustificamur.”(Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	34r;	Donnelly,	James,	and	McLelland,	The	Peter	
Martyr	Reader,	143.)	
31	 “Nec	 omittendum	 nequaquam	 fidei	 convenire	 ut	 nos	 iustificet	 qua	 nostra	 est	 actio.	 ...	 Sed	 caput	
iustificationis	a	Christo	est	promissionibus	atque	misericordia	dei.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Corinthios,	34v;	Donnelly,	
James,	and	McLelland,	The	Peter	Martyr	Reader,	145.)	
32	 “...	 de	 iustificatione	 qua	 scopus	 est	 et	 finis	 omnium	 quae	 Paulus	 tractare.	 Quaestio	 vero	 his	 verbis	





































Vermigli	 continues	 by	 asking:	 since	 there	 are	 these	 two	 significations	 of	 being	
justified,	namely	either	in	re	or	in	existimatione,		
																																																						
36	 “Interdum	 vero	 iustificat	 Deus	 absolvendo	 a	 peccatis,	 adscribendo	 et	 imputando	 iustitiam.	 ...	 Estque	
iustificare	 iudicio,	 verbis,	 testimonio	 et	 assertione	 aliquem	 pro	 iusto	 habere.“	 (Ibid.,	 517;	 Vermigli,	
Predestination	and	Justification,	87–88.)	
37	“Haec	prima	est	iustitia,	quae	animis	nostris	Dei	beneficio	per	Christum	inest	et	adhaeret.	Deinde	cum	
iam	 ipsos	 sic	 restituit	 ac	 refinxit,	 opera	 largitur	 recta	et	 sancta,	quorum	usu	atque	 frequentia	paritur	 in	




and	 since	 the	 same	God	 is	 author	of	 both,	which	of	 the	 two	 should	we	









the	 other.	 Pace	 James,	 there	 is	 no	 indication	 that	 Vermigli	 no	 longer	 “incorporate[s]	
regeneration	 and	 sanctification	 under	 the	 rubric	 of	 justification.”39	 As	 we	 have	 seen	
above,	Vermigli	writes	that	there	are	two	scriptural	meanings	of	“to	 justify,”	and	even	
though	he	gives	priority	to	forensic	justification	“in	the	proposed	discussion,”	he	clearly	
affirms	 that	 God	 is	 the	 author	 of	 both	 a	 forensic	 and	 a	 real	 (infused	 and	 formative)	
justification.40	The	same	can	be	seen	from	the	way	in	which	Vermigli	introduces	the	two	
options:	he	holds	that	God	sometimes	brings	forth	actual	righteousness	in	human	beings,	
and	 sometimes	 he	 justifies	 by	 imputing	 righteousness	 (interdum	 …	 interdum).41	 This	
construction	demands	that	justification	in	re	is	an	actual	possibility	for	Vermigli,	despite	
his	 not	 focussing	 on	 this	 in	 the	 scholium.	 In	 sum,	 Vermigli	 holds	 that	 God	 does	 his	








sit	 author,	 utrum	 ex	 duobus	 in	 disputatione	 proposita	 sequemur?	 Posterius,	 idque	 propterea	 quod	
renovatio	Dei	spiritu	afflata,	et	iustitia	nostra	quoad	habitum	ex	bonis	operibus	acquisitum,	adeo	sunt	dum	

















he	himself	 is	 just,	but	 that	which	he	 communicates	 to	us,	by	which	we	are	both	 truly	
counted	 just	 and	 are	 just	 in	 fact.”43	 Vermigli	 states	 that	 he	 does	 not	 deny	 that	 the	






seems	 to	 be	 not	 so	much	 in	 the	 reality	 of	God’s	 gifts,	 but	 in	 the	 human	 capability	 of	
accepting	 them.	 What	 Vermigli	 seems	 to	 be	 saying	 is	 that	 the	 Spirit-infused,	









qua	 ipsi	 vere	 et	 habeamur,	 et	 simus	 iusti.”	 (Vermigli,	 Ad	 Romanos,	 548;	 Vermigli,	 Predestination	 and	
Justification,	159.)	





(Vermigli,	 Ad	 Romanos,	 518;	 Vermigli,	 Predestination	 and	 Justification,	 90.)	 Eric	 Parker	 situates	 this	












































an	 intrinsic	 justification.48	 Put	 differently:	 Vermigli	 endorses	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	
justification	 in	 re	 and	 yet	 is	 hesitant	 towards	 it	 insofar	 as	 he	 emphasizes	 that	 it	 is	
imperfect,	which	 calls	 for	 grace	 to	be	 given	 through	an	 imposition.	Both	of	 this	 taken	
together	 suggests	 that,	 for	 him,	 God’s	 grace	 is	 somehow	 given	 both	 intrinsically	 and	
extrinsically.		
Christopher	 Castaldo	 has	 concluded	 from	 this	 that	 Vermigli’s	 doctrine	 of	
justification	can	be	summarised	as	a	duplex	iustitia	or	a	double	justification.49	According	
to	Alister	McGrath,	this	doctrine,	which	has	become	associated	with	the	views	of	Gasparo	
Contarini	 (1483-1542)	 and	 the	 Regensburg	 Colloquy	 of	 1541,	 essentially	 proposes	 a	
double	formal	cause	of	justification,	a	iustitia	imputata	and	a	iustitia	inhaerens.50	But	it	
seems	 that	 Castaldo	 does	 not	 agree	 with	 this	 definition,	 because	 he	 also	 holds	 that	
“Vermigli	would	fervently	protest”	against	the	“inclusion	of	internal	renewal	along	with	




have	 seen	 of	 Vermigli’s	 position	 in	 the	 Romans	 scholium,	 Castaldo’s	 assertion	 that	





direct	 cause	 of	 sanctification	 and	 the	 doing	 of	 good	 deeds.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 regeneration,	 although	
logically	 prior,	 is	 not	 the	 basis	 for	 forensic	 justification.	 The	 ground	 for	 forensic	 justification	 is	 the	
righteousness	of	Christ	alone.	Thus,	the	relationship	between	regeneration	and	justification	is	not	exactly	
























of	 Peter	 Martyr’s	 theology.”52	 This	 assessment	 still	 holds	 true,	 especially	 for	 his	
understanding	of	justification.	As	we	shall	see,	Vermigli’s	notion	of	how	human	beings	can	
be	united	to	Christ	lies	at	the	heart	of	his	understanding	of	the	workings	of	grace.	Indeed,	








































this	 spiritual	 union	 is	 the	 restoration	 of	 human	 beings	 to	 their	 original	 dignity.	 This	
regeneration	 finds	 its	 ultimate	 fulfilment	 in	 the	 eschaton.	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 Vermigli	
associates	 this	 spiritual	 union	 with	 a	 progressive	 process	 of	 actual	 regeneration	 that	
already	begins	in	this	life,	as	he	writes	in	the	letter	to	Beza:	“We	begin	while	living	here	to	



















59	 “Donis	 coelestis	 quae	 credendo	 sumus	 assequuti	 excultam	 habere	 hic	 vivendo	 incipimus	 et	 magis	














Crucially,	 Vermigli	 posits	 also	 a	 third	 union	with	 Christ,	which	 shall	 be,	 for	my	








Head	 himself	 as	 Paul	 says	 [in	 Eph.	 4:16]	 his	 Spirit	 flows	 and	 is	 derived	
through	the	joints	and	ligaments	into	ourselves	as	his	true	and	legitimate	
members.	Wherefore	this	communion	with	our	Head	is	prior,	in	nature	at	




sita	 est,	 sed	 etiam	 spiritus	 vim	 instaurantem	 addi,	 qua	 nostra	 quoque	 corpora,	 caro,	 sanguis	 et	 natura	
immortalitatis	 capacia	 fiunt	 et	 Christiformia	 (ut	 ita	 dixerim)	 indies	 magis	 ac	 magis	 evadunt.	 Non	 quod	


































union	 has	 been	 effected.	 Once	 the	 Christian	 is	 connected	 to	 Christ	 by	 this	 mystery,	
Vermigli	teaches,	a	connection	between	head	and	body	is	established:	the	believer	has	
become	–	as	Vermigli	repeatedly	phrases	it	–	“flesh	of	his	flesh	and	bones	of	his	bones.”67	
With	 this	 connection	established,	 from	 the	head	“various	gifts,	heavenly	benefits,	 and	
divine	properties	flow	down	into”	the	believers,	furthering	more	and	more	their	spiritual	
union	with	Christ.68		


















after.70	 Similarly,	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 Chapter	 One	 how	 the	 main	 distinction	 between	





have	 just	 seen	 with	 regard	 to	 its	 relationship	 to	 a	 temporal	 sequence,	 however,	 his	
approach	 to	how	this	gift	 is	 given	differs	between	 the	 two	contexts.	More	differences	
emerge	 when	 one	 compares	 Vermigli’s	 answer	 to	 how	 God	 bestows	 his	 grace	 in	 the	
context	of	his	teaching	on	justification,	on	the	one	hand,	and	in	the	context	of	his	doctrine	
of	the	believer’s	union	with	Christ,	on	the	other	hand.	Indeed,	an	integration	of	Vermigli’s	
doctrines	 of	 justification	 and	 union	 with	 Christ	 will	 bring	 to	 the	 fore	 tensions	 in	 his	








































indicates	 a	 parallel	 between	 Rom	 IA	 and	 the	mystical	 union,	 but	 also,	 secondly,	 their	
character	as	the	beginning	of	a	process.	We	have	seen	that	both	spiritual	union	and	Rom	










way,	 he	 gives	 right	 and	 holy	works	…”)73	 as	much	 as	 the	 secret	mystical	 union	 is	 the	
condition	for	the	spiritual	union	(it	is	“prior,	in	nature	at	least	though	perhaps	not	in	time,”	
as	seen	above).74		
In	 sum,	we	 can	 conclude	 that	 the	 two	 aspects	 of	 the	 justification	 in	 re	 of	 the	
Romans	scholium	parallel	the	mystical	and	spiritual	unions	with	Christ	both	regarding	their	

































and	 sanctification.77	 This	 means	 that,	 for	 Garcia,	 justification	 and	 sanctification	 “are	
distinct	but	inseparable	graces	that	come	to	us	simultaneously	in	our	union	with	Christ.”78	



































in	 a	 passage	 that	we	have	 already	partly	 encountered	 in	 our	 exposition	 above.	When	
explaining	his	 threefold	distinction	 in	 the	unions	with	Christ,	 right	after	describing	 the	
natural	union,	he	adds:		

































‘making	 right’	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 God	 and	 human	 beings.	 Another	 way	 of	
framing	this	would	be	to	say	that	it	concerns	original	sin,	and	the	way	this	sin	is	(or	is	not)	
taken	 away.	 As	we	 have	 seen	 in	 chapter	 one,	 however,	 Vermigli’s	 stance	 on	whether	
original	sin	is	taken	away	in	baptism	through	faith	somehow	wavers.	For	while	Vermigli	
holds	that	the	guilt	of	original	sin	is	forgiven	in	baptism	and	through	faith	in	Christ,	neither	
baptism	 nor	 faith	 do	 away	with	 the	 fact	 that	 human	 beings	 are	 ‘originally’	 sinful,	 for	
Vermigli.	Insisting	that	“it	is	not	perfectly	true	that	original	sin	is	abolished	in	the	believers	








–	 is	 that	 experience	 teaches	 that	 “the	 corruption	of	 nature	 remains”	 and	 that	 human	
beings	hence	are	“unapt	for	divine	things,”	unable	to	receive	God’s	gifts.84		
The	crux	of	the	aporia	we	have	encountered	therefore	lies	in	the	question	whether	




God’s	grace	because	of	 their	 fallen	nature.	They	cannot	 receive	 the	gift,	because	 their	
fallenness	inescapably	corrupts	it.	Through	their	very	reception	of	the	gift,	they	defile	it.	
In	order	to	circumvent	this	problem,	God	has	to	bestow	his	grace	in	such	a	way	that	it	
remains	 extrinsic	 to	 human	 beings,	 at	 least	 in	 its	 ‘initial’	 justifying	moment.	 Castaldo	
																																																						
83	 “Reatus	 enim,	 et	 offensa	Dei	 per	 fidem	 in	Christum	 in	baptismo	 condonatur,	 quamvis	 adhuc	materia	





















hardly	 happens	merely	 forensically,	 or	 extrinsically.	 That	 Vermigli	 affirms	 the	 latter	 is	
particularly	 clear	 in	 the	 Romans	 scholium,	 where	 he	 writes	 that	 –	 unless	 it	 is	 given	
extrinsically	–	God’s	gift	of	grace	is	defiled	by	human	fallenness:	the	“righteousness	and	
renewal	 by	 which	 we	 are	 created	 anew	 by	 God”	 is	 “imperfect	 because	 of	 our	




transforms	 and	 sanctifies	 human	 beings.	 Because	 if	 human	 beings	 have	 the	 power	 to	
resist	 God’s	 transformative	 grace,	 does	 this	 not	 imply	 that	 God’s	 grace	 is	 not	 really	
transformative?		







88	 “Idcirco	 autem	 dicimus,	 in	 ea	 iustitia	 et	 instauratione	 qua	 reformamur	 a	 Deo	 non	 posse	 esse	













justification	 only,	 if	 it	 is	 granted	 that	 Vermigli’s	 focus	 on	 Rom	 II	 rather	 than	 Rom	 I	 is	
motivated	by	didactic	or	rhetorical	reasons	rather	than	a	fundamental	objection,	as	I	have	
argued.		
As	 observed	 in	 section	 one	 above,	 there	 is	 a	 tension	 in	 the	 Romans	 scholium	





























held	 that	 in	 the	 Romans	 scholium,	 “regeneration	 logically	 precedes	 forensic	
justification.”91	In	this	view,	it	is	the	Holy	Spirit	who	first	enables	human	beings	through	
regeneration	to	have	faith	in	God.	Once	they	have	faith,	however,	they	are	justified	by	








when	 justifying	 human	 beings	 is	 not	 intrinsic	 but	 extrinsic	 to	 them,	 namely,	 Christ’s	
righteousness.	Individuals	can	apply	this	righteousness	to	themselves	through	faith.	If	this	
faith	 is	 given	 to	 human	beings,	 is	 it	 given	 to	 them	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	 righteousness,	
namely	extrinsically?	If	the	initial	premise	–	that	nothing	in	human	beings	can	cause	their	







...	 In	 electis	 fidem	 repente	 inserat,	 tamen	quoniam	 causa	 est	 fidei	 prior	 est	 illa	 et	 dignitate	 et	 ordine.”	
(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	562;	Vermigli,	Predestination	and	Justification,	190–91.)	
91	James,	“De	Justificatione:	The	Evolution	of	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli’s	Doctrine	of	Justification,”	331.	See	also	
J.	 V.	 Fesko,	 who	 claims	 that	 in	 the	 Romans	 scholium	 “regeneration	 …	 logically	 precedes	 justification,”	
because	“Vermigli	argues	that	justification	and	forgiveness	of	sins	can	in	no	way	be	attributed	to	anything	










gift	of	 faith	 is	one	that	 intrinsically	 transforms	human	beings.	This	means	that	when	 it	
comes	to	the	gift	of	faith,	he	does	not	retain	the	premise	that	God’s	gift	has	to	remain	
extrinsic	to	its	receiver	in	order	for	it	to	retain	its	integrity.	When	God	pours	faith	into	the	
elect,	 this	 faith	 is	 communicated	 to	 them	 in	an	 intrinsic	way,	 such	 that	 the	Holy	Spirit	
“changes	and	makes	a	new	heart	and	mind.”92	For	a	human	heart	will	“perpetually	resist”	
God’s	 gifts,	 unless	 it	 “has	 been	 renewed	 by	 the	 Spirit	 and	 the	 grace	 of	 God”	 and	 is	
“inwardly	changed.”93	At	this	point,	therefore,	Vermigli	not	only	allows	for	a	gift	of	God’s	



























element	 which	 cannot	 be	 subsumed	 under	 a	 forensic	 understanding	 of	 God’s	 gift,	
especially	through	his	understanding	of	the	nature	of	faith.	Therefore,	the	aporia	I	have	






grace.	 What	 does	 this	 mean,	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 metaphysical	
framework	 underlying	 Vermigli’s	 thought?	 As	 we	 will	 see	 in	 this	 section,	 the	 aporia	
indicates	that	this	framework	is	not	uniform.	More	specifically,	the	disjunction	of	the	two	
elements	that	form	the	aporia	is	caused	by	the	fact	that	each	of	them	is	sustained	by	a	
different	metaphysical	 understanding	 of	 how	God’s	 being	 and	 the	 being	 of	 the	world	
relate.	
The	first	of	the	two	conflicting	assertions	that	led	to	the	aporia	comes	down	to	the	
fact	 that	human	beings	can	be	 intrinsically	 transformed	by	a	divine	gift.	This	assertion	

























a	 way	 that	 it	 changes	 the	 way	 human	 beings	 are,	 not	 just	 extrinsically,	 but	 also	





the	notion	that	God’s	gift	 to	human	beings	can	only	be	a	 ‘pure’	gift,	 if	 it	 is	given	 in	an	
extrinsic	way.	This	understanding	of	gift,	as	we	have	seen,	is	present	in	the	way	Vermigli	
envisages	the	gift	of	righteousness	to	be	given	in	justification.	Here,	the	Divine	gift	is	not	




































is	 hesitant	 to	 determine	 this	 priority	 as	 temporal.	 The	 fact	 that	 Vermigli	 insists	 on	 a	
temporal	sequence	in	the	way	he	envisages	God’s	gift	of	grace	to	be	given	in	one	context	
and	deprioritises	it	in	another,	again	indicates	a	tension	in	his	notion	of	gift.	It	moreover	









is	 not	 seen	 as	 determined	 by	 such	 a	 fundamentally	 ontological	 dependence,	 then	 it	
becomes	 possible	 to	 distinguish	 between	 ‘before’	 and	 ‘after’	 God’s	 gift.	 Therefore,	
Vermigli’s	ambivalence	about	whether	or	not	it	is	important	to	envisage	the	process	of	
salvation	 in	a	 temporal	 sequence	 confirms	 the	 thesis	 that	his	 theology	 simultaneously	
inhabits	two	different	metaphysical	frameworks.	
	In	 sum,	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 the	 workings	 of	 God’s	 gift	 of	 grace	 in	 Vermigli’s	
theology	 are	 aporetic.	 This	 aporia	 moreover	 indicates	 that	 Vermigli	 does	 not	 have	 a	
uniform	understanding	of	how	God’s	being	and	the	being	of	the	world	relate.	Instead,	his	
understanding	of	God’s	gift	of	grace	simultaneously	displays	the	marks	of	a	participatory	
metaphysics	 and	 of	 a	 univocal	 metaphysics	 sustaining	 it.	 As	 we	 shall	 see	 in	 the	 next	






Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli	 invested	 most	 of	 his	 academic	 energy	 in	 the	 question	 of	 the	
Eucharist,	 as	 he	 was	 prominently	 involved	 in	 the	 notoriously	 polemical	 Eucharistic	
controversies	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 century.	Not	 only	 did	 he	debate	with	 exponents	 of	 the	
Catholic	view,	both	in	person	and	in	writing,	but	he	was	also	engaged	in	controversy	with	

















contributions	 to	 the	 Eucharistic	 controversies,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 the	 extant	 secondary	
literature.	It	is	worth	noting	that	in	the	Eucharistic	controversies,	we	find	Vermigli	at	his	
																																																						














As	 I	 will	 argue,	 there	 is	 an	 unspoken	 but	 crucial	 presupposition	 in	 Vermigli’s	
Eucharistic	theology	concerning	the	relationship	between	God	and	the	world,	namely	that	
it	is	conceived	of	in	terms	of	spatial	distance,	rather	than	by	means	of	different	quality	of	
their	 being.	 As	 we	 shall	 see,	 this	 means	 that	 Vermigli’s	 standard	 understanding	 of	
presence	is	related	to	spatial	nearness,	or	indeed	denotes	the	enclosure	of	one	thing	in	
another.	 Simultaneously,	 however,	 it	 is	 the	 main	 thrust	 of	 his	 arguments	 against	
transubstantiation	to	deny	the	need	for	this	very	spatial	presence.	As	I	will	show,	this	leads	



















Ad	 hec	 Disputatio	 de	 eadem	 Universitate	 habita	M.D.	 XLIX	 (London:	 [R.	Wolfe],	 1549).	 The	 pagination	
restarts	with	the	disputatio,	which	is	why	I	will	refer	to	only	either	the	Tractatio	or	the	Disputatio	in	what	
follows,	even	though	they	are	found	in	the	same	volume.	An	English	translation	of	both,	together	with	a	





minutes	 of	 the	 Oxford	 Disputation	 are	 published	 together	 with	 the	 so-called	 Oxford	




rebuttal	 of	 Gardiner’s	 apology	 of	 transubstantiation,	 which	 the	 latter	 had	 published	
attacking	Cranmer’s	doctrine	of	the	Eucharist.8	Vermigli’s	third	published	work	which	is	
exclusively	engaged	 in	Eucharistic	 controversies	 is	his	Dialogue	on	 the	Two	Natures	of	



























in	 Die	 Zürcher	 Reformation:	 Ausstrahlungen	 Und	 Rückwirkungen,	 ed.	 Alfred	 Schindler	 and	 Hans	
Strickelberger	 (Bern:	 Peter	 Lang,	 2001),	 317–26;	 Nick	 Needham,	 “Peter	 Martyr	 and	 the	 Eucharistic	
Controversy,”	Scottish	Bulletin	of	Evangelical	Theology	17	(1999):	5–25;	David	C.	Steinmetz,	“Peter	Martyr	











other,	 since	McLelland	 focusses	 on	 the	 systematic	 contours	 of	 Vermigli’s	 sacramental	
theology	and	on	how	it	relates	to	the	reformer’s	entire	work,	whereas	Corda’s	emphasis	
is	 on	Vermigli’s	 theology	of	 Eucharist	 exclusively.	Corda	 carefully	presents	 and	 studies	
everything	 Vermigli	 has	 ever	 written	 on	 this	 topic,	 including	 sources	 that	 are	 rarely	
examined,	 such	 as	 the	 Defensio	 against	 Stephen	 Gardiner.	 In	 what	 follows,	 I	 will	
repeatedly	draw	on	his	fine	study.	






it	 being	 doubtful	 whether	 the	 terms	 “carnalization”	 and	 “spiritualization”	 are	 useful	
categories	at	all,	it	is	also	far	from	clear	by	what	standard	Zuidema	judges	something	to	
be	 “overly”	 carnal	 or	 spiritual.	 Indeed,	 the	 description	 of	 the	 middle	 position	 is	 best	
understood	as	Vermigli’s	declaration	of	intent	in	his	Eucharistic	theology.	When	seen	as	
such,	 however,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 apply	 to	 every	 theologian	 working	 within	 the	 Reformed	
tradition,	as	Luca	Baschera	has	pointed	out.17		




















determines	 the	“correct”	 interpretation	of	 the	Church	Fathers,	 let	alone	why	any	such	
interpretation	should	be	the	measure	for	orthodoxy.	In	a	tradition	without	a	magisterium,	
there	 is	 no-one	 to	 determine	 any	 one	 “correct”	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Fathers,	 and	 an	
academic	approach	cannot,	by	definition,	tacitly	assume	the	place	of	a	magisterium.	In	




In	 the	 words	 of	 a	 recent	 commentator,	 Vermigli	 has	 an	 “obsession	 with	 refuting	
transubstantiation.”22	Arguing	against	transubstantiation	is	indeed	Vermigli’s	key	concern	
in	all	of	his	Eucharistic	writings,	with	the	exception	of	the	Dialogus.	In	this	section,	I	will	
demonstrate	 that	 the	 rejection	of	 transubstantiation	 is	Vermigli’s	 foremost	 concern	 in	
Eucharistic	 writings	 and	 explain	 what	 this	 does	 and	 does	 not	mean.	 As	 we	 shall	 see,	







20	 In	Kim’s	own	words:	“The	validity	of	Peter	Martyr’s	use	of	 the	Fathers	against	 that	of	Brenz	…	 is	also	
significant	for	the	orthodoxy	of	the	Reformed	doctrine	of	the	Lord’s	Supper.	…	Peter	Martyr’s	…	validity	in	
the	 use	 of	 the	 Fathers	 for	 the	 support	 of	 his	 doctrines	 ought	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	 orthodoxy	 of	 the	
Reformed	camp	in	this	matter	[sic].”	(Ibid.,	321.)	
21	 Another	 contribution,	 which	 does	 not	 deserve	 closer	 attention	 because	 it	 is	 replete	 with	 untenable	
generalisations,	 is	Donald	 Fuller,	 “Sacrifice	 and	 Sacrament:	Another	 Eucharistic	 Contribution	 from	Peter	
Martyr	Vermigli,”	in	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	and	the	European	Reformations,	ed.	Frank	A.	James	(Leiden:	Brill,	

















discussed	made	a	 real	discussion	about	 the	matter	 impossible.25	The	 third	proposition	
(“The	body	and	blood	of	Christ	are	united	with	the	bread	and	wine	sacramentally”)26	was	
omitted	altogether	at	the	request	of	William	Tresham,	who	was	one	of	the	three	people	
debating	 with	 Vermigli.	 This	 is	 unfortunate,	 given	 that	 this	 was	 the	 only	 constructive	
rather	than	negatively	polemical	proposition.27		




into	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 of	 Christ.”28	 In	 essence,	 the	 treatise	 is	 an	 examination	 of	 all	










togeather	 with	 led,	 tynne,	 or	 some	 such	 baser	 mettall.”	 (Robert	 Parsons,	 A	 Review	 of	 Ten	 Publike	
Dispvuations	 or	 Conferences	 Held	 within	 the	 Compasse	 of	 Foure	 Yeares,	 under	 K.	 Edward	 &	 Qu.	Mary,	
Concerning	Some	Principall	Points	in	Religion,	Especially	of	the	Sacrament	&	Sacrifice	of	the	Altar	...	([Saint-
Omer]:	F.	Bellet,	1604),	37.)	
























that	 the	 faithful	 can	 enjoy	 through	 partaking	 in	 it.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 Vermigli’s	 most	
fundamental	 tenet	 in	 his	 debates	 with	 Roman	 Catholics	 that	 the	 theory	 of	
transubstantiation	 is	 simply	 not	 needed	 in	 order	 to	 claim	 Christ’s	 presence	 in	 the	
Eucharist.	His	argument	–	at	least	in	its	intention	–	is	therefore	merely	a	methodological	

















Regarding	 the	 first	 point,	 Vermigli	 consistently	 claims	 that	 the	 body	which	 the	
faithful	receive	in	the	Eucharist	is	Christ’s	true	body.33	Vermigli	consistently	agrees	with	
Gardiner	and	his	Oxford	disputants	that	the	body	and	blood	of	Christ	are	in	the	Eucharist.	























sacramentaliter	 ...	 et	 nobis	 vere	 exhiberi,	 et	 accipi	 asseveranter	 affirmo.”	 (Vermigli,	 Disputatio,	 89v;	
Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	280.)	




















































be	 treated	 with	 caution.	 He	 writes	 that	 Thomas	 and	 Roman	 Catholics	 since	 him	
“fundamentally	walk	by	sight,	by	their	creaturely	continuity	of	being	with	God.”46	To	speak	
of	 a	 “continuity	of	being,”	however,	 is	 to	 assume	a	univocity	of	being,	 rather	 than	an	
analogical	 participation	 in	God’s	 pre-eminent	 being.	Most	 commentators	would	 agree	
that	Thomas	Aquinas	understood	the	analogical	relationship	between	God	and	creation	
in	this	sense,	and	not	as	an	analogy	of	proportion.	However,	what	about	McLelland’s	claim	
that	 Vermigli	 conceives	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 God	 and	 the	 world	 through	 an	
analogy	of	proportion?	It	seems	similarly	hard	to	justify	this,	for	McLelland’s	claim	rests	
on	 very	 few	 references	 to	 Vermigli’s	 works,	 and	 these	 are	 more	 didactic	 than	
programmatic	in	nature.	Nowhere	does	Vermigli	propound	an	understanding	of	analogy	
as	 the	 basis	 of	 his	 theology,	 but	 he	 only	 gives	 overviews	 over	 classically	 Aristotelian	
distinctions	 in	 its	 understanding.47	 Therefore,	 as	 Klaus	 Sturm	 has	 intimated,	 the	













shared	 origin,	 and	 in	 another	 to	 a	 shared	 goal),	 and	 the	 third	 an	 analogy	 of	 proportion.	 (Cf.	 Vermigli,	
Kommentar	zur	Nikomachischen	Ethik,	259–60;	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	
168.)	
48	 “It	 seems	 doubtful	 that	 McLelland’s	 expositions	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘analogy’	 contribute	 much	 to	 the	
characterization	of	Martyr’s	 understanding	of	 revelation	 in	 general.”	 Sturm,	Die	 Theologie	Peter	Martyr	
Vermiglis,	143	n.	173	(my	own	translation).	




beyond	 the	 Oxford	 Disputation	 and	 Treatise	 are	 concerned	 with	 refuting	 Catholic	 or	
Lutheran	doctrines.	This	means	that	his	thinking	is	defined	by	the	terms	of	the	polemical	





























































51	 “In	medium	 ipsi	 prodeant	 et	 ostendant	 suis	 transubstantionibus	portens	 atque	terwtologiaij quid	
amplius	 (quam	 ego	 statuerim)	 solidi	 fructus	 et	 iuste	 commoditatis	 [?]	 ex	 hoc	 sacramento	 vel	
communicantibus	 vel	 ecclesiis	 attulerint.	 Commemorabunt	 manendi	 in	 Christo,	 et	 ut	 Christus	 in	 nobis	
maneat,	 beneficium?	 Ego	 quoque	 illud	 statuo.	 Commemorabunt	 vitae	 divinae	 coelestis	 atque	 beate	
consequtionem?	Ego	etiam	illam	pono.	Commemorabunt	perceptionem	corporis	et	sanguinis	Christi?	Ego	
non	 minus	 quam	 ipsi	 eam	 astruo,	 sed	 quae	 fide	 ac	 animo	 habeatur.”	 (Vermigli,	 Tractatio,	 epistola	 ad	
lectorem,	sine	pagina	[p.	8];	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	13.)	
























theological	 basis	 for	 Christ’s	 presence	 in	 the	 Eucharist	 through	 ridding	 it	 of	 ostensibly	
superfluous	ballast	while	 retaining	 the	 theological	 rationale	 for	Christ’s	 union	with	his	
faithful	in	the	Eucharist.	In	his	view,	his	proposed	changes	to	the	Catholic	doctrine	of	the	
Eucharist	 were	 not	 major,	 and	 he	 certainly	 saw	 himself	 not	 as	 an	 innovator,	 but	 as	
standing	in	the	orthodox	tradition	of	the	Church.	In	his	fictional	dialogue	with	the	Lutheran	
Johannes	Brenz,	for	instance,	the	whole	of	Vermigli’s	argument	amounts	to	an	argument	














With	 absolute	 conviction	 Vermigli	 constantly	 maintained	 that	 a	 sacramental	 understanding	 of	 this	







Vermigli’s	 perception	 of	 himself	 as	 standing	 within	 the	 orthodox	 Christian	
tradition,	 and	 his	 understanding	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 transubstantiation,	 however,	 are	




































Aquinas,	 then	 they	would	have	distinguished	between	 the	body	of	Christ	 in	 its	proper	

















be	 transgressed	without	 falling	 into	 unbearable	 logical	 contradictions,	whereas	 others	
																																																						
60	 “...	 si	 ibi	 sit	Corpus	Christi,	non	 tamen	hoc	 sit	per	modum	quanti.”	 (Vermigli,	Tractatio,	10r;	Vermigli,	
Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	37.)	
61	ST	III	75,1	ad	2.	See	also	ST	III	75,1	ad	3:	“Christ’s	body	is	not	in	this	sacrament	in	the	same	way	as	a	body	





62	 “Hoc	 est	 mirandum,	 quomodo	 ponant	 Corpus	 et	 quantum	 et	 vera	 ad	 esse	 non	 tamen	 per	 modum	
quanti.Cumque	statuant	vere	adesse	et	corporaliter	et	carnaliter	ut	dicunt	sed	non	localiter.	Quis	non	videat	
ista	 conficta	 esse	 ad	 eludenda	 argumenta?”	 (Vermigli,	 Tractatio,	 10r-v;	 Vermigli,	 Oxford	 Treatise	 and	
Disputation,	37.)	
63	“Vos	non	posse	corpus	et	sanguinem	Christi	corporaliter	et	substantialiter	pani	ac	vino	coenae	dominicae	








It	 is	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 Vermigli	 was	 more	 Aristotelian	 than	 were	 his	 Catholic	
contemporaries	who	defended	transubstantiation.	Vermigli	was	no	isolated	case	since	–	






disputation,	 he	 sarcastically	 declares:	 “It	 were	 an	 easy	 thing	 for	 anyone	 to	 play	 the	







of	 transubstantiation	 is	 his	 conviction	 that	 if	 Christ’s	 body	were	 really	 or	 substantially	
present	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 as	 Catholics	 claim,	 then	 it	 would	 have	 to	 be	 present	 in	 the	
Eucharistic	elements	 in	 the	same	way	as	any	other	body	 is	present	at	any	other	given	
place;	that	 is,	 locally	and	quantitatively.	This	presupposition	 implies	that	Vermigli	does	




66	 “They	 pervert	 the	 nature	 of	 things,	 since	 they	 take	 accidents	 away	 from	 their	 substance	 and	 proper	
subject.”	 /	 “Pervertunt	 rerum	 naturam	 cum	 a	 substantia	 et	 proprio	 subiecto	 abstrahunt	 accidentia.”	
(Vermigli,	Disputatio,	66v;	Vermigli,	Oxford	Treatise	and	Disputation,	251.)	
67	Charles	B.	Schmitt,	Aristotle	and	the	Renaissance	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1983),	26–27.	












right	 hand	 of	 the	 Father),	 and	 Christ’s	 body	 under	 the	 species	 of	 the	 sacrament.	
Interestingly,	the	four	objections	that	Aquinas	mentions	here	are	echoed	almost	literally	
by	 Vermigli	 and	 other	 reformers.71	 This	 shows	 that	 Vermigli’s	 critique	 is	 anything	 but	
novel;	 and	 indeed	 that	 it	 had	 been	 answered	 before.	 More	 importantly,	 however,	 it	
indicates	that	a	defence	of	transubstantiation	such	as	that	of	Aquinas	–	of	which	Vermigli	
had	been	no	doubt	aware	–	had	lost	its	appeal	by	the	sixteenth	century.	Specifically,	 it	
seems	 that	 for	 Vermigli	 (and	 some	 of	 his	 contemporaries),	 it	 had	 become	 difficult	 to	
imagine	or	accept	a	specific	mode	of	presence	of	Christ’s	body	unique	to	the	sacrament.	
It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	Aquinas	would	have	utterly	rejected	the	kind	of	“proper”	
presence	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	 elements	 that	 Vermigli	 presupposes	 transubstantiation	 to	
involve.	As	Anscar	Vonier	puts	it,	drawing	on	ST	III	q.	76,	for	Thomas	Aquinas,		









distinction	 between	 Christ’s	 body	 in	 his	 natural	 condition	 and	 his	 body	 in	 a	 condition	
specific	 to	 the	 sacrament.	 In	 particular,	 his	 unspoken	 presupposition	 that	 all	 bodies	
without	exception	must	possess	the	accidents	of	quantity	and	locality,	makes	it	impossible	














applied	 to	 the	presence	of	 Christ’s	 body	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 his	 understanding	of	 bodies	
involves	 positing	 a	 local,	 quantitative	 presence	 of	 the	 body	 of	 Christ	 in	 his	 natural	












teaches	 that	God	 the	 father	“lives	 in	heaven,	as	 the	Lord’s	prayer	 indicates,”	and	 that	
Christ	 sits	 at	 the	 right	 hand	 of	 the	 father	 “in	 his	 human	 nature.”73	 Because	 of	 the	



























We	 find	 a	 very	 clear	 instance	 of	 Vermigli	 indirectly	 confirming	 the	 distance	
between	heaven	and	earth	in	his	official	written	statement	to	the	Colloquy	of	Poissy.77	













are	 nourished	 there	 by	 Christ’s	 body.	 Taken	 together	 with	 Vermigli’s	 definition	 of	 a	































see	 below,	 is	 the	 union	 between	 Christ	 and	 the	 faithful,	 and	 his	 conviction	 that	 it	 is	
increased	through	the	participation	in	the	Eucharist.	

























insofar	 as	Vermigli	 conceives	 of	 heaven	 and	 earth	 as	 two	 spatially	 distant	 entities,	 he	
necessarily	 conceives	 of	 both	 in	 spatial	 terms.	 Whereas	 there	 has	 been,	 ever	 since	
Descartes,	an	appeal	in	thinking	of	our	earthly	surroundings	in	extended	spatial	terms,84	
spiritual	realities	such	as	“heaven”	need	not	be	conceived	of	in	spatial	terms	at	all.	The	
fact	 that	 Vermigli	 thinks	 of	 heaven	 in	 spatial	 terms	 is	 another	 crucial	 but	 unspoken	
presupposition	of	his	work.	
It	 is	 this	 presupposition	 about	 the	 character	 of	 heaven	 –	 in	 which	 the	 human	
nature	of	Christ	 is	to	be	found	–	together	with	the	presupposition	about	the	nature	of	











Taking	 a	 few	 steps	 back	 from	 Vermigli’s	 explicit	 argumentations	 about	 the	
presence	of	Christ	 in	the	sacrament,	 let	us	consider	what	kind	of	relationship	between	
God	and	the	world	is	implied	by	his	reasoning.	Underlying	both	presuppositions	we	have	












































deny	 it,	 why	 do	 you	 insist	 on	 promoting	 such	 a	 presence	 [in	 the	
Eucharist]?85	
Because	neither	the	lack	of	physical	contact	between	the	faithful	in	various	parts	of	the	
world	 nor	 their	 local	 separation	 from	 each	 other	 prevents	 their	 unity	 in	 Christ,	 the	
“enormous	 stretch	 of	 distance”86	 between	 Christ’s	 human	 nature	 in	 heaven	 and	 the	
faithful	 on	 earth	 is	 equally	 insignificant.	 Arguing	 “from	 the	 greater	 to	 the	 less	 by	
negation,”	 no	 local	 presence	 of	 the	 body	 of	 Christ	 is	 needed	 in	 the	 elements	 of	 the	
Eucharist,	“for	the	union	of	Christ	with	us	and	those	who	communicate	is	greater	than	
with	the	symbols.“87		
Vermigli	 uses	 marriage	 as	 a	 second	 simile	 to	 make	 the	 same	 point	 about	 the	
needlessness	of	“physical	contact	or	nearness	of	places.”	Husband	and	wife	are	said	to	be	





ut	 sint	 nobiscum	 (quemadmodum	 Paulus	 dicit)	 invicem	 membras?	 Scio	 non	 negabitis.	 Quod	 si	 istam	
unitatem	qua	per	Christum	in	unum	connectimur,	 locorum	interstitium	et	contactus	physicus	(qui	nullus	
esse	potest)	nihil	 impediunt,	cur	absque	reali	praesentia	et	corporali,	negatis	Christo	nos	vere	coniungi?	











et	 cum	 illis	 qui	 communicant	 quam	 sit	 cum	 symbolis.”	 (Vermigli,	 Tractatio,	 44v–45r;	 Vermigli,	 Oxford	
Treatise	and	Disputation,	90.)	
88	 “Quid	 hic,	 aut	 ullo	 contactu	 physico	 aut	 locorum	 propinquitate,	 opus	 est?	 ...	 Et	 tamen	 istam	 carnis	












nobody	will	 deny	 that	 Christ	 is	 joined	 to	 the	 Church	 as	well	 as	 to	 each	
believer	by	a	marriage	that	is	very	solid	and	spiritual.	Wherefore	a	spatial	
















pani	 aut	 vino	 alligare	 vel	 (ut	 dicitis)	 sub	 speciebus	 panis	 et	 vini	 operire.	 Sine	 his	 portentis	 vere	 Christo	

















faithful	 to	be	 characterised	by	a	 radical	 spatial	distance,	 to	 the	effect	 that	 “presence”	
without	further	qualification	means	spatial	presence	or	local	nearness	for	him.	This	notion	











not	be	a	physical	presence	of	 the	human	nature	of	Christ	enclosed	 in	 the	sacramental	







94	Even	though	all	 three	similes	share	the	same	tertium	comparationis,	 there	are	nonetheless	 important	
differences	between	them.	In	the	case	of	the	simile	of	the	sun,	what	overcomes	the	spatial	distance	is	sense	
perception.	Sense	perception	is	not,	however,	constant	or	ontological.	By	contrast,	in	the	marriage	simile,	
the	 local	separation	 is	only	a	temporal	condition	of	a	stable,	 indeed	arguably	ontological,	connection.	 In	
contrast	to	the	simile	with	the	body	of	Christ,	the	marital	bond,	which	–	as	Vermigli	maintains	–	holds	despite	




















5)	 Which	 Change?	 Hunsinger,	 Vermigli	 and	 the	 Status	 of	 the	 Eucharistic	
Elements	
As	we	have	seen,	Vermigli	argues	that	Christians	can	be	intimately	connected	with	the	
human	nature	 of	 Christ	 despite	 there	 being	 a	 spatial	 gulf	 between	 them.	 Though	 this	
argument	 is	made	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	Eucharistic	 controversies,	 however,	 the	union	
between	Christ	and	his	faithful	that	it	promotes	is	in	fact	independent	of	the	sacrament.	
This	 section	 will	 argue	 that	 Vermigli’s	 effective	 circumventing	 of	 the	 sacramental	
elements	renders	problematic	George	Hunsinger’s	appeal	to	Vermigli	as	a	source	for	a	
proposal	 of	 a	 new	 ecumenical	 notion	 of	 the	 sacramental	 change.	 That	 Vermigli	
nonetheless	ascribes	importance	to	the	sacrament	and	its	physical	aspects	is	primarily	due	
to	its	role	with	regard	to	the	union	of	the	faithful	with	Christ.	
Vermigli’s	 effective	 bypassing	 of	 the	 sacramental	 elements	 is	 perhaps	 best	
illustrated	by	means	of	the	categories	established	by	Henri	de	Lubac	in	his	famous	study	
Corpus	Mysticum.	De	Lubac	distinguished	 three	aspects	of	 the	one	body	of	Christ:	 the	
historical	body	(the	body	born	of	the Virgin),	the Eucharistic body	(signified	by	bread	and	
wine),	 and	 the ecclesial body	 (the	 body	 of	 the	 church).95	 He	 studied	 the	 relationship	
between	these	three	bodies,	 indicating	how	the	Church	Fathers	and	theologians	of	the	
Middle	 Ages	 consistently	 emphasized	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 one	 body	 of	 Christ,	 while	


















Describing	 Vermigli’s	 Eucharistic	 theology	 by	means	 of	 this	 framework	 shows	 that	 his	
doctrine	of	a	spiritual	communication	between	Christ	and	the	faithful	associates	the	two	





the	 breaking	 of	 the	 bread.	 As	 we	 shall	 see	 below,	 he	 has	 his	 reasons	 for	 ascribing	
importance	 to	 it.	 Still,	 the	 fact	 that	 Vermigli’s	 Eucharistic	 theology	 bypasses	 the	
sacramental	body	on	a	fundamental	level	nonetheless	indicates	a	problem	with	George	



















the	Reformed	 tradition	while	not	being	 church-dividing	 from	a	Catholic	 point	of	 view.	
Hunsinger	deems	Vermigli	a	“weighty	thinker	whose	ideas	today	seem	full	of	ecumenical	
promise”99	because	he,	together	with	Bucer	and	Cranmer,	found	“nothing	objectionable”	
in	 a	 sacramental	 change	of	 the	elements	 along	 the	 lines	proposed	by	Hunsinger.100	 In	





In	 the	 context	 of	 his	 discussion	 of	 Theophylact’s	 statement	 “that	 bread	 is	
transformed,	converted,	and	transelemented,”	Vermigli	indeed	wrote	that	“if	these	words	
are	 taken	 sacramentally	we	do	not	mind.”102	 Similarly,	 during	 the	Oxford	Disputation,	
Vermigli	 stated	 that	 Theophylact’s	 terms	 “changing,”	 “transforming”	 and	
“transelementing”	as	applied	to	the	bread	were	admissible	“because	of	the	sacramental	
change.”103	 These	 two	 references,	 on	 which	 Hunsinger	 bases	 Vermigli’s	 alleged	
endorsement	 of	 transelementation,	 highlight	 not	 only	 that	 Vermigli	 was	 less	 than	
enthusiastic	about	 transelementation	than	Hunsinger	makes	 it	 seem,	but	also	 that	 the	
real	question	here	is	about	the	nature	of	what	Vermigli	calls	the	sacramental	change.	
For	what	is	it	that	is	changed	in	and	through	the	Eucharist?	Vermigli’s	answer	to	
this	 question	 features	 the	 Eucharistic	 elements	 at	 best	 only	 secondarily.	 Hunsinger	
himself	says	this	along	the	 lines	we	have	seen	above,	admitting	that	 for	Vermigli,	“the	
primary	 union	 and	 communion	 in	 the	 Eucharist	 were	 always	 between	 Christ	 and	 the	
communicants,	not	between	Christ	and	the	elements.”104	Any	change	of	the	elements	is	


























think	 that	 the	 bread	 of	 which	 Jesus	 speaks	 in	 John	 6	 has	 anything	 to	 do	 with	 the	
sacramental	 elements.	 Rather,	 Vermigli	 argues	 that	 Jesus	 refers	 to	 a	 spiritual	


























holds	 that	 Christ’s	 flesh	 can	 be	 appropriated	 both	 per	 sacramentum	 and	 citra	






























115	 “Abunde	 satis	 est	 ut	 nexibus	 atque	 compagibus	 quibusdam	 spiritualibus	 illi	 nectamur.	 Quae	 tamen	












reign	 in	 heaven	 with	 the	 Father”	 precisely	 because	 there	 are	 the	 bonds	 of	 faith,	 the	
scriptures	and	sacraments	between	the	two.117	Vermigli	grants	that	the	sacraments	and	
the	word	 of	 God	 are	 “joints	 and	 fastenings	 through	which	 the	 spirit	 of	 God	 becomes	
effective.”	He	makes	 it	equally	clear,	however,	 that	 faith	 is	primary.	Nothing	else	 than	
faith	is	necessary	to	be	united	with	Christ	–	not	even	the	outward	word	or	the	sacraments:	
“The	only	link	and	fastening	necessary	in	adults	is	faith,	by	which	we	are	joined	with	Christ	
himself,	 inseparably.”118	 Whereas	 faith	 is	 therefore	 the	 primary	 channel	 for	
communication	between	Christ	and	his	faithful,	the	external	word	and	the	sacraments	are	
such	 channels	 in	 a	 derivative	 and	 secondary	 manner	 insofar	 as	 they	 are	 effective	
instruments	by	which	faith	is	kindled.	
What	is	clear	so	far	is	that	Vermigli	closely	relates	the	sacraments	to	the	middle	




116	 “Et	 ea	 sunt	 fides	 comprimis	 verba	Dei	 et	 Sacramenta.	Per	 ista	 spiritus	 a	nostro	 capite	dimanans	per	
Ecclesiam	divagatur	et	sua	membra	proportione	iusta	vegeat	et	assimilat.”	(Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	(1583),	
1095;	McLelland	and	Duffield,	The	Life,	Early	Letters	and	Eucharistic	Writings	of	Peter	Martyr,	347.)	
117	 “Nam	 membra	 Christi	 semper	 eo	 spectant,	 ut	 eius	 similiora	 evadant.	 Neque	 communionem	 hanc	
mysticam	impediunt	locorum	spatia,	sed	dum	in	terris	degimus	haberi	potest,	licet	spsum	Christi	corpus	in	
coelis	 cum	 patre	 sedeat	 atque	 regnet.	 Abunde	 satis	 est	 ut	 nexibus	 atque	 compagibus	 quibusdam	
spiritualibus	illi	nectamur.	Quae	tamen	vincula	seu	colligationes	ab	ipso	capite	pendent	ac	derivantur.	Et	ea	
sunt	 fides	comprimis,	verba	Dei	et	Sacramenta.”	 (Vermigli,	Loci	Communes	 (1583),	1095;	McLelland	and	
Duffield,	The	Life,	Early	Letters	and	Eucharistic	Writings	of	Peter	Martyr,	347.)	
118	“Sunto	etiam	compagines	et	commissurae	per	quas	spiritus	Dei	fiat	efficax.	 ...	Fidei	una	est	 in	adultis	





specific	 about	 this,	writing	 that	 the	 sacraments	 both	 confirm	and	 increase	 the	middle	
union:	
Of	this	intimate	conjunction	[viz.	the	‘middle’	union]	both	Baptism	and	the	
Lord’s	 Supper	 are	 not	 idle,	 but	 most	 certain	 symbols.	 We	 are	 made	
partakers	of	this	kind	of	conjunction	the	moment	we	believe	in	Christ;	and	
because	 faith	 must	 be	 employed	 in	 the	 profitable	 reception	 of	 the	
sacraments,	 when	 we	 make	 use	 of	 the	 sacraments,	 this	 conjunction	 is	
confirmed	and	increased.119	
As	for	the	element	of	confirmation,	it	is	to	be	remembered	that	Vermigli	is	a	vehement	




in	 faith	 –	 confirms	 the	 believer’s	 mystical	 union	 with	 Christ.	 When	 he	 says	 that	 the	
Eucharist	increases	the	middle	union,	then	he	equally	means	the	Eucharist	as	received	in	
faith.	For	those	who	have	already	begun	to	be	in	union	with	Christ,	the	Eucharist	can	spur	
their	 faith	 further.	 When	 someone’s	 faith	 grows	 stronger,	 however,	 an	 increasing	
abundance	of	God’s	 spirit	 flows	 into	 them,	which	means	 that	 they	become	more	 fully	
conjunct	with	the	mystical	body	of	Christ.121	
Given	 that	 both	 the	 confirmation	 and	 the	 increase	 of	 union	 with	 Christ	 that	
Vermigli	 ascribes	 to	 the	 sacrament	 are	 therefore	 derived	 from	 faith,	 is	 there	 any	
advantage	of	the	use	of	the	Eucharist	over	against	‘simply	believing’,	or	the	exercise	of	






sacramentis	 utiliter	 percipiendis	 fides	 adhibenda	 est,	 idcirco	 per	 eam	 coniunctio	 illa,	 dum	 Sacramentis	
utimur	 et	 confirmatur	 et	 augetur.”	 (Vermigli,	 Loci	 Communes	 (1583),	 1109;	 Vermigli,	 Life,	 Letters,	 and	
Sermons,	136	[translation	adapted].)		
120	On	Vermigli’s	 stance	 on	 the	manducatio	 impiorum,	 see	 Corda,	 Veritas	 Sacramenti,	 158–64.	 See	 also	




















ways	 in	 which	 to	 eat	 Christ’s	 body	 and	 blood,	 this	 happens	 “most	 clearly”	 or	 “most	
illustriously”	 in	 the	 Eucharist,	 “because	 the	 sacraments	 of	 the	 body	 and	 blood	 are	
perceived	by	means	of	our	bodies.”124	







the	 Eucharist	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 transform	 not	 only	 the	 spirit	 but	 also	 the	 body	 of	
believers	 another	 reason	why	 he	wants	 to	 retain	 the	 sacrament	 as	 a	 practice?	 Is	 it	 a	
																																																						
122	 “Adiecit	 autem	 symbola,	 ut	 not	 tantum	 auribus,	 sed	 etiam	 oculis,	 gustu,	 tactu,	 olfactu	 ad	 salute	
incitaremur.	Ille	enim	est	factor	noster:	nemoque	illo	melius	novit,	ad	coelestia,	et	spiritualia	quanta	nostra	
sit	hebetudo:	ideoque	nobis	tot	modis	censuit	succurrendum.”	(Ibid.,	683.)	











As	part	of	his	engagement	with	 the	Fathers,	Vermigli	 repeatedly	holds	 that	 the	
saving	 power	 of	 Christ’s	 body	 passes	 into	 the	 believers’	 bodies.	 This	means,	 as	 Corda	
observed,	 that	 Vermigli	 is	 “able	 to	 accept,	 perhaps	 more	 than	 other	 Reformed	
theologians,	the	idea	expressed	by	several	Church	Fathers,	that	our	flesh	truly	receives	
Christ’s	flesh	and	that	we	are	united	with	Christ	corporaliter.”125	The	way	Vermigli	goes	
about	accepting	 this	patristic	 idea,	however,	 is	 through	a	strict	priority	of	 the	spiritual	
dimension,	which	governs	whatever	bodily	dimension	is	added	secondarily.	The	body	of	
Christ	 is	 received	 spiritually	 by	 faith,	 but	 because	 Christ	 thereby	 communicates	 his	
character	to	the	believers,	their	whole	nature	is	transformed,	including	their	bodies:	
The	 virtue	 and	efficacy	of	 the	body	of	 Christ	 does	not	 stop	 in	 the	 spirit	
(where	it	is	received	by	faith),	but	also	reaches	to	our	body	and	restores	




their	 spiritual	 union	 (transfundere).	 From	 this	 spiritual	 union,	 the	 divine	 qualities	
secondarily	 also	 overflow	 to	 the	 bodies	 of	 the	 believers	 (redundare).127	 In	 short:	 true	
union	with	Christ	“is	related	first	to	the	soul,	and	then	overflows	to	the	body.”128	
The	fact	that	he	holds	that	the	grace	received	in	the	Eucharist	redounds	also	to	the	







pertingat,	 illudque	 reficiat,	 et	 spiritualiter	 immutet,	 non	 absurde	 dicere	 possumus,	 carnem	 nostrum	
recipere	corpus	domini.”	(Vermigli,	Defensio,	298.)	
127	See	e.g.	“Transfundit	divinas	illa	qualitates,	et	dotes	suas	virtutum,	immoralitatis,	foelicitatis,	primum	in	










The	 fruit	 of	 the	 Eucharist	 unequivocally	 pertains	 to	 the	 spiritual	 world	 –	 the	 physical	
elements	are	merely	auxiliary	to	the	spiritual	union	of	the	faithful	with	Christ.	From	the	
heights	 of	 this	 spiritual	 union,	 the	 sacrament	 subsequently	 affects	 the	 bodies	 of	 the	





to	 the	 union	 with	 Christ.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 last	 chapter,	 union	 with	 Christ,	 for	
Vermigli,	 is	 oriented	 towards	 the	 eschaton.	 It	 is	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 new	 life	 of	 the	
resurrection,	even	if	this	has	to	remain	inchoate	while	here	on	earth.	This	is	why	Vermigli	
can	say	that	human	nature	“though	it	is	corrupt,	sinful	and	mortal	is	rendered	capable	of	

























We	 have	 seen	 that	 Vermigli’s	 theological	 thinking	 in	 the	 polemic	 situation	 of	 the	
Eucharistic	debates	is	determined	by	a	kind	of	hyper-spatiality.	Even	heaven	is	a	space,	
though	 its	 place	 is	 far	 away	 from	 earth.	 He	 takes	 it	 for	 granted	 that	 the	 relationship	
between	God	and	 the	world	 is	one	of	 spatial	distance.	The	gulf	between	God	and	 the	
world,	 for	 Vermigli,	 can	 only	 be	 overcome	 between	 either	 a	 kind	 of	 spatial	
rapprochement,	 or	 through	 spiritually	 bridging	 the	 distance.	 Deeming	 the	 former	





of	 the	 Eucharist,	 which	 he	 cannot	 value	 in	 its	 own	 right.133	 Put	 differently:	 because	
Vermigli	had	 to	 introduce	 faith	and	 the	power	of	 the	Holy	Spirit	as	central	 theological	





























Similarly,	 the	 way	 Vermigli	 envisages	 Christ’s	 presence	 in	 and	 through	 the	
Eucharistic	elements	also	points	to	a	univocal	understanding	of	divine	and	earthly	being.	







this	part	of	his	 theological	universe	does	not	 inhabit	 a	metaphysical	 framework	which	
allows	for	different	qualities	of	being,	where	a	transcendent	reality	can	be	at	the	heart	of	
a	created	reality	without	being	‘there’	in	the	same	way	as	the	latter.	
At	 his	 most	 polemical,	 in	 the	 Eucharistic	 controversies,	 Vermigli’s	 thought	 is	
therefore	 inhabiting	 a	 univocal	 metaphysics.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 elements	 in	 his	












–	 is	 his	 critique	 of	 the	 Lutheran	 theologian	 Johannes	 Brenz.	 In	 his	Dialogus,	 Vermigli	
criticises	Brenz’	understanding	of	the	ubiquity	of	both	natures	of	Christ	in	its	application	











have	seen	 in	chapter	 two	how	this	doctrine	 implies	a	real	 inherence	of	Christ	 in	 those	




Vermigli	 describes	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 union	 with	 Christ.	 We	 have	 seen	 how	 Vermigli	
considers	the	Eucharist	to	be	a	‘joint’	between	Christ	and	his	faithful,	through	which	Christ	
pours	his	 spirit	 into	 them.	He	also	 speaks	 about	how	Christ’s	 spirit	 overflows	 into	 the	
bodies	of	believers,	and	how	they	begin	to	take	on	Christ’s	nature.	This	language	arises	
from	and	is	motivated	by	Vermigli’s	literacy	in	the	patristics.	For	the	Church	Fathers,	the	
imagery	 of	 partaking	 in	 Christ	 was	 sustained	 by	 a	metaphysics	 of	 participation	 in	 the	
Divine.135	Vermigli’s	use	of	the	same	language	still	conveys	an	attempt	to	go	beyond	the	









thereby	 prevents	 the	more	mystical	 sides	 of	 his	 theology	 –	 as	 inspired	 by	 the	 Church	
Fathers	–	to	come	to	full	fruition.		
We	can	conclude	that	Vermigli’s	largely	polemical	Eucharistic	theology	is	mainly	
sustained	 by	 an	 implicit	 univocal	 metaphysical	 framework.	 Certain	 elements	 of	 his	
Eucharistic	 thinking	 nevertheless	 display	 to	 some	 extent	 an	 alternative	 metaphysical	
framework	 based	 on	 participation	 in	 the	 Divine.	 However,	 in	 Vermigli’s	 Eucharistic	
theology	as	a	whole,	the	balance	is	more	weighted	towards	the	univocal	framework.		
In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 we	 shall	 widen	 our	 focus	 from	 the	 Eucharistic	 table	 to	










instance,	 Vermigli’s	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 as	 to	 whether	 Christians	 ought	 to	 resist	

















Communes	 with	 other	 comparable	 reference	 works	 (like	 Calvin’s	 Institutes	 and	 Melanchthon’s	 Loci	
Communes).	 Cf.	 Robert	M.	 Kingdon,	The	 Political	 Thought	 of	 Peter	Martyr	 Vermigli:	 Selected	 Texts	 and	
Commentary	(Genève:	Droz,	1980),	iii.	
2	 Cf.	 Marvin	 W.	 Anderson,	 “Royal	 Idolatry:	 Peter	 Martyr	 and	 the	 Reformed	 Tradition,”	 Archiv	 Für	
Reformationsgeschichte	69	(1978):	174–75.	
3	For	a	new	and	fascinating	study	of	 the	phenomenon	of	 the	political	use	of	 the	Old	Testament	 in	early	











insofar	 as	 it	 is	 pertinent	 to	 our	 main	 focus,	 which	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 underlying	
metaphysical	 frameworks	 of	 his	 work.	 In	 the	 first	 section,	 I	 will	 survey	 the	 existing	
secondary	literature	on	Vermigli’s	political	writings.	Sections	two	to	four	are	exegetical,	
focussing	on	the	two	foci	of	authority	in	Vermigli’s	ideal	political	commonwealth.	Section	






work.	 This	 duality,	 I	 will	 argue,	 points	 to	 the	 much	 more	 fundamental,	 metaphysical	









deemed	 the	 people	 of	 Israel	 in	 the	 Old	 Testament	 to	 be	 a	 model	 of	 such	 a	 unified	
community.		















Political	 Thought,	 though	minor,	 is	 less	 than	 flattering.	 In	his	 chapter	on	 “The	Duty	 to	
Resist”,	Skinner	deems	Vermigli	 to	be	“far	 from	coherent.”	He	reached	this	conclusion	
based	on	his	reading	of	Vermigli’s	views	on	political	resistance,	asserting	that	the	“later	
Commentary	on	the	Book	of	 Judges	appears	 to	withdraw	much	of	what	 [Vermigli]	had	
earlier	allowed	in	his	commentary	on	Romans.”6	Skinner	refers	to	the	fact	that	Vermigli	






















John	 Knox,	 where	 consistency	 in	 the	 question	 of	 tyrants	 is	 achieved,	 Skinner	 holds,	 because	 the	 latter	





















explicitly	 reflects	on	“Whether	 it	be	 lawful	 for	subjects	 to	rise	against	 their	princes”,	a	
passage	 that	 seems	 to	 have	 escaped	 Skinner’s	 attention.13	 Vermigli’s	 stance	 here	 is	
identical	to	the	one	which	he	took	in	the	Romans	commentary.14	He	holds	that	while	it	is	
unlawful	for	ordinary	subjects	to	rebel	against	their	princes,	those	who	elect	the	superior	
power	 (such	as	 the	electors	of	 the	emperor	 in	 the	Holy	Roman	Empire)	can	resist	and	














Skinner’s	 argument	 about	 a	 development	 in	 Vermigli’s	 thought	 between	 the	 Romans	 and	 Judges	
commentaries	 was	 invalid	 (Gary	 Jenkins,	 “Citizen	 Vermigli:	 The	 Political	 Animal	 in	 Vermigli’s	
Commonwealth,”	Reformation	&	 Renaissance	 Review	 15,	 no.	 1	 (2013):	 84–98,	 here	 86.)	 It	 is,	 however,	








Marvin	Anderson.	The	 former	published	an	annotated	anthology	of	 some	of	 the	most	
important	of	Vermigli’s	political	writings,	in	the	Travaux	d’humanisme	et	Renaissance,16	
along	with	a	series	of	articles	on	the	issue,17	whereas	the	latter	contributed	an	article	in	
the	Archiv	 für	 Reformationsgeschichte.18	 Since	 then,	 a	 handful	 of	 other	 scholars	 have	











Oxford.	 (Anderson,	Peter	Martyr,	 A	 Reformer	 in	 Exile	 (1542-1562):	 A	 Chronology	 of	 Biblical	Writings	 in	
England	and	Europe,	313.)	
16	 Kingdon,	 Political	 Thought.	 Kingdon	 reproduces	 English	 translations	 prepared	 by	 Vermigli’s	
contemporaries	and	published	in	the	Elizabethan	period,	mainly	Anthony	Marten’s	1583	translation	of	the	
Common	Places	(cf.	xxv).	






















One	of	 the	crucial	cornerstones	of	Vermigli’s	 ideal	commonwealth	 is	what	he	calls	 the	




judges	 –	whose	 government	 Vermigli	 called	 republican	 –	 as	 the	 golden	 period	 of	 the	
history	of	Israel.22	Ultimately,	however,	as	Gary	Jenkins	has	rightly	noted,	it	is	idle	to	play	
off	Vermigli’s	‘monarchical’	against	his	‘republican’	insights,	as	he	does	not	see	them	as	





As	we	 shall	 see,	 three	elements	 characterise	Vermigli’s	 view	of	 the	magistrate:	
first,	 the	magistrate	 is	divinely	 instituted,	which	 in	turn	means	that	he	mediates	God’s	
power.	Secondly,	the	ideal	magistrate,	for	Vermigli,	is	to	his	or	her	subjects	what	a	father	
or	a	mother	is	to	their	family:	a	caring	role-model.	However,	even	when	magistrates	fall	
short	 of	 this	 ideal,	 Vermigli	 still	 maintains	 that	 they	 are	 instituted	 by	 God.	 The	 third	
characteristic	 of	 magistrates	 is	 that	 they	 are	 the	 keystone	 in	 Vermigli’s	 (Aristotelian)	




























Vermigli:	 first,	 it	 is	 a	 natural	 insight,	 which	 God	 planted	 in	 human	 beings	 from	 their	
creation,	that	there	cannot	be	any	society	without	a	ruler.26	Secondly,	this	was	confirmed	
by	 the	 Scriptures.	 As	 Bradford	 Littlejohn	 points	 out,	 the	 order	 of	 this	 argument	 is	
remarkable:	 Vermigli	 first	 appeals	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 natural	 law,	 which	 is	 then,	





granted	 this	 to	 bees,	 cranes,	 and	 fishes,	 for	 these	 living	 creatures	 have	
their	kings	and	princes	...	Therefore,	given	that	human	beings	are	the	most	
excellent	 of	 all	 living	 creatures	 and	 communicate	 through	 the	 greatest	











potestates	primum	coeperint	aut	quando	primum	a	Deo	 fuerint	ordinate,	 respondeo,	 lumen	 illud,	quod	
Deus	mentibus	 nostris	 indidit,	 iam	 inde	 ab	 initio	 hominibus	 rationem	 dominandi	 indicasse.	 Eam	 autem	
postea	variis	Dei	oraculis	fuisse	confirmatam.”	(Vermigli,	Ad	Romanos,	604;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	3.)	










the	 Romans	 commentary;	 however,	 they	 are	 mirrored	 almost	 one-to-one	 in	 his	
Magistrate-scholium	 in	 the	 Judges	 commentary.	 There,	 he	 concludes	 in	 no	 uncertain	
terms	that	“God	is	the	true	and	proper	cause	of	Magistrates.”30	
However,	 Vermigli	 goes	 further	 than	 asserting	 that	 magistrates	 are	 divinely	
instituted.	Commenting	on	Romans	13:4,	he	writes	that	the	magistrate	governs	as	God’s	




such	 stands	 between	 God	 and	 human	 beings.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 overestimate	 just	 how	
mediatory	Vermigli	envisages	the	magistrate	to	be.	The	magistrate	stands	between	God	
and	human	beings,	precisely	because	he	mediates	God’s	power	and	authority	to	them.	




we	doubtlessly	ought	 to	honour	and	 revere	 it.”33	 This	 remains	 true	even	 if	 persons	 in	
power	are	corrupt.	For	even	then,	magistrates	participate	in	God’s	authority.	This	leads	
Vermigli	to	affirm,	in	a	brief	discussion	of	Aristotle’s	typology	of	governments,	that	God	is	
the	 author	 even	 of	 tyranny,	 oligarchy	 and	 democracy	 (the	 degenerated	 versions	 of	
monarchy,	aristocracy	and	polity).	“For	there	is	in	them	a	power	and	strength	to	rule	and	
																																																						






















































is	 “to	 punish	wicked	works,	 and	 to	 advance	 good	 ones.”40	 In	 short:	 good	magistrates	
promote	a	virtuous	life,	both	through	their	own	example,	and	by	punishing	those	who	do	
not	 live	 virtuously.41	 Given,	 moreover,	 that	 piety	 is	 the	 most	 excellent	 of	 all	 virtues,	
magistrates	ought	to	refer	all	things	to	the	exercise	of	piety.42	We	will	see	below	how	this	
affects	 Vermigli’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	
church.	
Even	 when	 magistrates	 fall	 short	 of	 this	 virtuous	 and	 pious	 ideal,	 however,	
Vermigli	 still	 holds	 that	 they	 are	 instituted	 and	 sustained	 by	 God.	 Even	 non-ideal	





like	 these,	 incidentally,	 were	 what	 vexed	 Quentin	 Skinner.	 Contrary	 to	 what	 Skinner	
believed,	however,	Vermigli	wrote	all	of	the	above	in	his	Romans	commentary.	
















piety.”	 /	 “Cum	pietas	 omnium	 virtutum	 sit	 praeclarissima,	 tum	dominus	 regnat	 quando	 ad	 illam	omnia	
referuntur.”	(Vermigli,	In	librum	iudicum	commentarii,	107v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	23.)	










the	magistrates:	 by	 not	 paying	 taxes,	 priests	 fail	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 socially	 unifying	
function	 of	 the	 magistrate,	 and	 hence	 weaken	 the	 “support	 and	 sinews”	 of	 the	
commonwealth.47		

















ensure	 that	 God	 is	 rightly	 worshipped,	 and	 that	 human	 beings	 exercise	 their	
responsibilities	towards	each	other.	In	doing	so,	magistrates	follow	the	good	example	of	




















them.	 If	 a	 physician	 cures	 not	 according	 to	 the	 prescript	 of	 Galen	 or	
Hippocrates,	 or	 if	 an	 apothecary	 sells	 bad	 and	 corrupt	 drugs,	 the	
Magistrate	ought	to	correct	them	both.	And	if	he	may	do	this	in	other	arts,	
I	see	no	cause	why	he	may	not	do	it	in	religion.52	
All	 practical	 “arts”	 ought	 to	 be	 overseen	 by	 the	 magistrate	 who	 exercises	 the	 most	
important	 and	 unifying	 “art.”	 Should	 anyone	 exercise	 their	 calling	 improperly	 –	 like	 a	
pharmacist	selling	contaminated	medicine	–	the	magistrate	is	to	hold	them	accountable.	
This	reasoning	is	then	applied	to	religion	as	well:	it	is	the	magistrate’s	duty	to	make	sure	
that	 his	 or	 her	 subjects	 worship	 God	 rightly,	 and	 that	 the	 Church’s	 teaching	 is	 pure.	




























government)	 is	 the	 chief	 architectonic	 art,	 unifying	 the	 commonwealth.	 In	 his	
Commentary	on	the	Nicomachean	Ethics,	Vermigli	makes	a	similar	point.	He	stresses	that	
the	difference	between	ethics	and	politics	is	merely	one	of	degree,	because	both	have	the	




above	 politics,	 he	 asserts,	 since	 the	 Scriptures	 determine	 the	 latter	 through	 their	
instructions	for	how	to	order	society.	For	example,	the	Scriptures	approve	of	magistrates,	












politica	 facultas	 in	 republica,	 nimirum	 ut	 cives	 omnes	 ex	 virtute	 agant?”	 (Vermigli,	 Kommentar	 zur	
Nikomachischen	Ethik,	96;	Vermigli,	Commentary	on	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	45.)	
56	“Ubi	primum	illud	occurrit,	proprietatem	illam	principis	 facultatis	vel	ut	 ipse	 loquitur	arcitektonikhj 
facultati	 divinarum	 literarum	 debere	 assignari.	 ...	 Approbant	 enim	 magistratus,	 volunt	 esse	 pastores,	













More	 generally,	 this	means	 that	 each	 individual	 is	 under	 two	 kinds	 of	 authority:	 one	
political	 and	 one	 spiritual.	 Vermigli	 speaks	 of	 two	 kinds	 of	 subjections:	 a	 political	































Vermigli	 does	not	 say	 that	 they	are	 subject	 to	 the	word	of	God.	Rather,	ministers	 are	



































that	 the	 first	 relies	 on	 institutional	mediation.	 There	 is,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 a	 ‘chain	 of	
power.’	This	means	that	the	way	through	which	ordinary	subjects	access	or	even	perceive	
































What	we	have	seen	so	 far	 is	a	different	approach	 to	 the	way	 in	which	God’s	power	 is	
channelled	 in	 political	 matters	 and	 in	 the	 spiritual	 realm.	 While	 the	 Magistrate	
hierarchically	 mediates	 God’s	 political	 authority	 in	 ways	 that	 cannot	 be	 eschewed,	
Vermigli	 practically	 dispenses	 with	 mediation	 in	 the	 spiritual	 realm.	 Despite	 these	





















The	 conflicting	 authoritative	 claims	 of	 the	 word	 of	 God	 and	 the	 magistrate	 manifest	










cannot	 be	 negotiated	 without	 the	 word	 of	 God	 as	 the	 all-determining	 third.	 In	 what	
follows,	 I	will	 outline	 two	of	 Vermigli’s	main	 attempts	 to	 relate	 civil	 and	 ecclesiastical	
















unifying	 function,	 bearing	 responsibility	 for	 all	 of	 society,	 ministers	 are	 under	 the	
jurisdiction	 of	 the	 magistrates	 also	 as	 holders	 of	 their	 office,	 even	 though	 less	
straightforwardly	so	(in	“some	way”).	The	two	examples	 in	which	magistrates	ought	to	
exercise	 their	 jurisdiction	over	ministers	as	ministers	 relate	 to	 two	of	Vermigli’s	 three	
marks	of	the	church:	purity	of	teaching	and	the	lawful	use	of	the	sacraments.69	If	ministers	
do	not	 fulfil	 their	ministry	 in	accordance	with	 these	marks,	 thereby	essentially	making	
their	church	into	something	less	than	a	church,	the	magistrate	ought	to	intervene.		
Indeed,	 in	 Vermigli’s	 view,	 the	 magistrate	 “ought	 to	 take	 care	 that	 bishops,	


























should	 be	 no	 need	 for	 hermeneutics	 –	 even	 though	 this	 already	 constitutes	 a	






their	 own	 immediate	 insight	 into	 the	 word	 of	 God.	 Given	 both	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	



















never	quite	makes	 this	 argument	explicit.	He	 indeed	 strongly	holds	 the	 first	half	 of	 it:	
“There	is	no	doubt	that	ministers	are	subject	to	the	magistrate	insofar	as	they	are	human	
beings	 and	 citizens,	 together	with	 their	 lands,	wealth,	 and	 possessions.”71	 And	 yet	 he	





the	magistrate	 being	 subject	 –	 even	 ‘only’	 spiritually	 subject	 –	 to	 anyone.	 This	 is	why	
Vermigli	cannot	ultimately	say	that	the	magistrate	is	subject	to	ministers	of	the	Church.	





by	 a	 political	 subjection.	 For	 it	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 it	 with	 regard	 to	 the	







dubitatione	magistratui	 subiiciuntur.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	 commentarii,	 185v;	 Kingdon,	Political	
Thought,	35.)	
72	E.g.	“The	civil	power	ought	to	be	subject	to	the	word	of	God,	which	is	preached	by	the	ministers.”	/	“Civilis	
itaque	 potestas	 at	 verbo	 dei	 quod	 a	 ministris	 praedicatur	 subiici	 debet.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	
commentarii,	185v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	35.)	
73	 “Subiicitur	 ecclesiastica	 potestas	 magistratui	 non	 spirituali	 subiectione,	 sed	 politica.	 Nam	 quod	 ad	
sacramenta	 et	 conciones	 attinet,	 non	 ei	 subiicitur,	 quia	magistratus	 verbum	 dei	 et	 sacramenta,	 quibus	
Chapter	Four:	Authority	
	 150	




compel	 the	ministers	 if	 they	 teach	 against	 the	word	of	God.	 74	How	 is	 it	 possible	 that	
magistrates	 exercise	 such	 a	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 ministers	 of	 the	 Church,	 without	
subjecting	them	spiritually?	
Granted,	the	magistrate	is	only	entitled	to	enforce	the	word	of	God	negatively,	as	
it	were.	Without	making	 it	 explicit,	 Vermigli	 effectively	 draws	 a	 distinction	 between	 a	
positive,	‘creative’	spiritual	authority	of	the	magistrate,	which	he	forbids,	and	a	negative,	
‘conservative’	 spiritual	 jurisdiction,	which	he	affords	 to	 the	magistrate.	This	distinction	
makes	some	sense.	However,	it	still	relies	on	the	same	problematic	premise	we	observed	






it	 for	granted	that	the	magistrates	and	the	ministers	of	 the	church	(or	 indeed	anyone)	
essentially	 agree	 on	 this	 understanding.	 The	 way	 in	 which	 Vermigli	 works	 out	 the	








vel	 secus	 administrent	 sacramenta	 quam	 a	 verbo	 dei	 praescriptum	 fuerit.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	
commentarii,	185v;	Kingdon,	Political	Thought,	35.)	
74	As	we	have	already	seen,	Vermigli	repeatedly	and	in	no	uncertain	terms	maintains	that	if	ministers	do	not	
teach	 “right”	 or	 fail	 to	 administer	 the	 sacraments	 in	 an	 “orderly”	manner,	 then	 “it	 is	 the	 office	 of	 the	
Magistrate	to	compel	them	to	an	order,”	making	sure	they	“mingle	not	fables”	nor	“abuse”	the	Sacraments.	





understanding	 of	 the	 word	 of	 God,	 including	 disagreement	 between	magistrates	 and	
religious	entities.	
Vermigli’s	 attempt	 to	 resolve	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 conflicting	 claims	 to	





















However,	 is	 there	 an	 alternative	 way	 of	 understanding	 Vermigli’s	 political	
theology,	and	specifically	the	way	in	which	he	related	the	word	of	God	to	the	political	and	













tradition	 of	 political	 theology	 in	 England	 throughout	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 sixteenth	
century.”76	Kirby	maintains	that	Bullinger	and	Vermigli	“were	no	less	than	chief	architects	
of	 the	 reformation	of	 the	Church	of	 England.”77	He	makes	 this	 argument	 through	 five	
“close	and	sympathetic”	readings	of	texts	by	the	Zurich	theologians,	one	of	them	being	
Vermigli’s	 De	 Magistratu	 scholium.78	 Kirby	 concludes	 that	 “Peter	 Martyr	 Vermigli	
constructs	 a	 sophisticated	 theological	 analysis	 of	 the	 ‘hypostatic’	 union	 of	 civil	 and	
ecclesiastical	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	 person	 of	 the	 godly	 Prince.”79	 In	 particular,	 Vermigli’s	
assertion	of	the	“due	subordination	of	all	subjects,	in	all	matters	civil	and	ecclesiastical,	to	
the	 supreme	magistrate”	 became,	 in	 Kirby’s	 estimation,	 “a	 key	 stabilising	 principle	 of	
early-modern,	secular	political	life	in	general	and	of	the	Tudor	state	in	particular.“80	In	this	
section,	I	shall	outline	and	discuss	Kirby’s	reading	of	Vermigli’s	political	theology.	
In	 short,	 Kirby	praises	Vermigli’s	 thought	 for	 simultaneously	 adhering	 (1)	 to	 an	
Aristotelian	conception	of	 the	unifying,	architectonic	 function	of	 the	magistrate,	which	
includes	 a	 Pseudo-Dionysian	 hierarchical	 logic	 of	 mediation,	 and	 (2)	 to	 an	 allegedly	
																																																						
75	Ackroyd’s	work	–	a	doctoral	thesis	–	primarily	argues	that	Church	discipline	was	a	mark	of	the	Church	for	
the	Reformers	and	especially	 for	Vermigli,	 and	 that	 the	 contemporary	Church	would	be	well-advised	 to	
rediscover	this	dimension	of	being-Church.	However,	in	his	discussion	of	Vermigli’s	ecclesiology,	he	is	critical	
of	 the	way	Vermigli	negotiates	 the	 relationship	between	civil	and	ecclesiastical	power,	 showing	 that	 for	
Vermigli,	the	Church	is	effectively	made	Church	–	in	a	jurisdictional	way	–	only	through	the	civil	government:	




















between	 two	 kinds	 of	 Christian	 Platonism:	 Augustinian	 and	 Pseudo-Dionysian.	 He	
characterises	them	as	follows:	
At	 the	 Augustinian	 pole,	 emphasis	 is	 placed	 upon	 the	 utter	












Dionysian	 understanding	 of	 politics	 is	 due	 to	 his	 insistence	 that	 the	 magistrate	 is	 a	
mediator	 of	 divinely	 ordained	 governance.	 In	 this	 context,	 he	 operates	 within	 a	
hierarchical	logic.		
However,	 how	 does	 Vermigli	 square	 this	 “Pseudo-Dionysian”	 element	 of	 his	











hand,	 he	 writes,	 it	 might	 appear	 that	 “Vermigli’s	 Augustinian	 insistence	 upon	 the	
incommensurability	of	the	‘two	subjections’	has	 led	him	…	into	a	Manichean	dualism,”	





complicates	 and	 clarifies	 the	 question	 by	 arguing	 for	 a	mutual	 subjection	 of	 civil	 and	












as	 it	 can	 communicate	 itself.	 This	means	 that	 there	 is	no	 straightforward	mutuality	of	











dicit,	 sed	 tamen	docet	quemadmodum	 ius	dici	debeat.”	 (Vermigli,	 In	 librum	 iudicum	commentarii,	186r;	
Kingdon,	 Political	 Thought,	 37.)	 See	 also:	 “For	 these	 powers	 are	 somewhat	 interchangeable,	 and	 are	
occupied	 with	 the	 same	 things	 in	 different	 ways,	 and	mutually	 help	 one	 another.”	 /	 “”Sunt	 enim	 hae	








Magistratu	 scholium,	 between	 laws	 “touching	 outward	 discipline”	 and	 “the	 inward	
motions	of	 the	mind.”90	 Based	on	 this	 distinction,	 Kirby	maintains	 that	 the	 “nature	of	
ecclesiastical	 power”	 for	 Vermigli	 is	 “inherently	 equivocal,”	 consisting	 of	 two	 non-
overlapping	aspects:	
To	 the	extent	 that	 the	ecclesiastical	 jurisdiction	 is	 involved	 in	 the	 ‘lawes	
touching	outwarde	discipline’	it	is	properly	subordinated	to	the	rule	of	the	
civil	magistrate.	At	the	same	time,	the	magistrate	is	bound	to	submit	to	the	




visible	 realm	 of	 the	 civitas	 terrena,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 civil	 and	
ecclesiastical	jurisdiction	are	united	in	the	Prince	or	magistrate.91	
According	to	Kirby,	 therefore,	Vermigli	circumvents	both	a	Manichean	dualism,	and	an	
‘Erastian’	 conflation	 of	 civil	 and	 ecclesiastical	 powers	 by	 asserting	 that	 there	 are	 two	
separate	 kinds	 of	 ecclesiastical	 power	 (or	 better:	 two	 aspects	 in	 which	 authority	 is	
exercised	 in	 the	 Church).	 Their	 distinction,	 moreover,	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 distinction	
between	an	internal	and	an	external	realm.	Rather	than	holding	a	Manichean	distinction	
between	flesh	and	spirit,	 the	fundamental	distinction	 in	the	work	of	Kirby’s	Vermigli	 is	
therefore	between	‘inward’	and	‘outward.’	In	everything	related	to	‘outward’	matters,	the	
supreme	 power	 and	 authority	 over	 both	 civil	 and	 ecclesiastical	 matters	 lies	 with	 the	
magistrate.	 In	 everything	 ‘inward’,	 however,	 the	 supreme	 power	 is	 neither	 with	 the	
magistrate,	nor	mediated	by	him,	but	“immediately	derived	from	the	divine	source.”	It	
remains	unclear,	however,	why	this	immediate	power	should	still	be	termed	–	as	in	the	
above	 quotation	 –	 an	 “aspect	 of	 ecclesiastical	 power.”	 Is	 this	 power	 not	 operative	
independently	of	the	Church?		
																																																						






argues	 that	 for	 Vermigli	 “the	 power	 exercised	 by	 ministers	 through	 the	Word	 in	 the	





shown	 above,	 Vermigli	 categorically	 refuses	 the	 need	 for	 any	 kind	 of	 institutional	
mediation	of	the	word	of	God.	Ministers	therefore	do	not	mediate	the	word	of	God	qua	










violent,	 lusty	or	 gluttonous	 thoughts?	 If	 these	 are	 the	 kind	of	 “inward	motions	of	 the	
mind”	which	fall	under	the	 jurisdiction	of	the	ecclesiastical	power,	according	to	Kirby’s	
Vermigli,	 then,	 presumably,	 as	 soon	 as	 these	 thoughts	 are	 turned	 into	 actions,	 they	
become	 ‘outward’	 and	 visible,	 and	 hence	 fall	 under	 the	 magistrate’s	 jurisdiction.	
However,	 such	 a	 distinction	would	be	 impossible	 to	maintain	 in	 practice,	 because	 the	
distinction	between	thoughts	and	actions	 is	fluid:	 ideas	can	be	agents,	and	actions	can	
engender	thoughts.		









“laws	 regarding	 outward	 discipline	 through	 punishing	 transgressors	 with	 bodily	
punishments.”93	This	suggests	that	Vermigli’s	“outward	discipline”	relates	to	the	manner	
of	 punishment	 appropriate	 to	 the	 magistrate,	 such	 as	 imprisonment	 or	 exile.	 Such	
punishments	of	 the	body	 cannot	be	administered	by	ministers	of	 the	Church,	 as	 their	
manner	of	punishing	 is	 clearly	defined	–	as	we	 shall	 see	–	 through	a	 church	discipline	
modelled	after	Matthew	18:15-17.		
Paragraphs	 10-12	 of	 De	 Magistratu	 display	 most	 evidently	 that	 the	 point	 of	
Vermigli’s	association	of	‘outward	discipline’	with	the	magistrate	is	not	that	magistrates	–	
in	his	view	–	are	responsible	for	an	outward,	bodily	realm	whereas	ministers	care	for	an	










entrusted	 to	 their	 care,	 and	 princes,	 in	 turn,	 ought	 not	 to	 neglect	 the	 souls	 of	 their	
subjects.	They	both	care	for	the	holistic	wellbeing	of	the	people.	Where	thy	differ	is	in	the	
way	they	reprove	offenders:		
Whatever	 difference	 there	 is,	 ...	 it	 entirely	 concerns	 the	 manner	 of	













The	 kinds	 of	 penalties	 princes	 or	 magistrates	 can	 inflict	 on	 their	 erring	 subjects	 are	
outward.	This	means	that	they	can	remove	a	bishop	whose	conduct	is	bad.	In	fact,	this	
seems	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	main	 purposes	 of	 Vermigli’s	 deliberations	 here:	 he	wishes	 to	
maintain	that	“although	a	king	may	remove	an	unprofitable	and	harmful	bishop,	a	bishop	
cannot	 in	 turn	 depose	 a	 king,	 if	 he	 sinned.”96	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 a	 bishop’s	 tools	 for	
admonishing	 kings,	 in	 Vermigli’s	mind,	 simply	 do	 not	 include	 dethronement.	 This	 is	 a	
special	application	of	Vermigli’s	general	principle	that	the	Church’s	tools	for	admonishing	
cannot	be	“outward,”	or	involving	any	physical	force.	Excommunication	is	the	most	severe	
punishment	 a	minister	 of	 the	 church	 can	 administer,	which	 –	 as	 Vermigli	 reminds	 his	
readers	 –	 happened	 to	 several	 emperors	 in	 history	 who	 were	 excommunicated	 for	
committing	public	grievous	sins.	Vermigli’s	conclusion	from	this	 is,	however,	that	while	




























and	 slander,	 whereas	 the	 Church	 cannot	 allow	 such	 behaviour.100	 Similarly,	 the	 civil	
authorities	are	not	concerned	with	whether	or	not	offenders	repent	as	long	as	they	serve	
their	 sentences,	 whereas	 the	 church	 cannot	 reconcile	 offenders	 unless	 they	 are	
penitent.101	This	means	that	Vermigli	distinguishes	the	Church’s	jurisdiction	from	the	one	
exercised	by	the	civil	authorities.	There	are	differences	both	in	the	scope	of	offences	with	
which	 they	 are	 concerned,	 and	 in	 the	 purposes	 of	 correction.	 Furthermore,	 from	 the	
instances	mentioned	which	call	for	Church	discipline,	it	is	obvious	that	Church	discipline,	










St.	 Augustine.103	 Regardless	 of	whether	 it	 is	 fair	 to	 call	 such	 a	 distinction	Augustinian,	
however,	–	something	which	cannot	be	investigated	within	the	scope	of	the	present	study	




















distinction,	 Kirby	 holds	 that	 Vermigli	 “follows	 Augustine	 in	 looking	 directly	 to	 the	
incarnate	Christ	to	accomplish	an	immediate	union	of	the	soul	with	God	by	grace	alone	in	

















We	 have	 seen	 how	 the	 magistrate,	 in	 Vermigli’s	 view,	 mediates	 God’s	 power	 and	
authority.	The	structure	of	authority	thus	conveyed	 is	one	 in	which	God	 is	seen	as	the	
primordial	giver	of	authority,	who	shares	his	power	with	lesser	authorities.	In	this	sense	–	
and	as	Vermigli	explicitly	holds	–	the	magistrate	is	“between	God	and	human	beings.“105	
Even	 though	 his	 language	 of	 the	 magistrate	 being	 in	 God’s	 place	 could	 indicate	 a	
representational	 (rather	 than	ontologically	determined)	structure	of	power,	where	 the	







suggests	 otherwise.	 Moreover,	 Vermigli	 is	 unambiguous	 about	 his	 belief	 that	 lesser	
authorities	 –	 the	 magistrates	 –	 participate	 in	 God’s	 power.	 This	 indicates	 that	 he	
presupposes	a	 structure	of	 authority	 in	which	God	acts	 in	 and	 through	worldly	power	
structures.	He	does	not	work	alongside	the	magistrates,	or	merely	delegate	his	power	to	
them,	but	works	through	them.		
Therefore,	 the	 acts	 of	 the	 magistrate	 unite	 in	 themselves	 divine	 and	 human	
causality.	The	 two	causalities	do	not	compete,	but	 rather	one	 indwells	 the	other,	as	 it	









objected,	 however,	 that	 such	 communities	 are	 in	danger	of	 harbouring	or	 legitimizing	
oppression.	Indeed,	the	fact	that	all	power	derives	from	a	single	source	does	come	with	






Another	 picture	 presents	 itself	 in	 the	 case	 of	 God’s	 power	 and	 authority	
manifested	in	his	word.	Here,	God’s	power	needs	no	mediation,	as	Vermigli	maintains.	It	



















Vermigli	 is	 very	 optimistic	 in	 this	 regard,	 believing	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 achieve	 an	
agreement	on	what	 the	word	of	God	calls	means	and	 requests,	 and	 that	hermeneutic	
considerations	 are	 superfluous	 because	 of	 the	 perspicuity	 of	 Scripture.	 Consequently,	










the	 magistrate	 and	 the	 word	 of	 God	 –	 each	 function	 within	 different	 structures	 of	
authority,	 and	 they	 in	 turn	 grow	out	 of	 two	metaphysical	 frameworks	 insofar	 as	 they	
embody	 different	 visions	 of	 how	God’s	 power	works	 in	 the	world.	 If	 this	 is	 the	 case,	
however,	 then	 it	 is	 no	wonder	 that	 there	 are	 tensions	 in	Vermigli’s	 political	 theology,	





















might	 object	 that	 enquiring	 into	 Vermigli’s	 implied	metaphysics	 amounts	 to	 imposing	





The	first	reason	 is	 theological,	and	follows	from	a	 ‘strong’	theology	of	creation,	
which	involves	the	conviction	that	everything	about	everything	is	created	and	sustained	
by	 God.	 If	 this	 theological	 premise	 is	 granted,	 then	 there	 can	 be	 no	 strict	 separation	
between	‘religious’	and	‘philosophical’	discourses,	or	between	faith	and	reason.	It	follows	
moreover	 that	 one	 should	 not	 envisage	 there	 to	 be	 purely	 ‘philosophical’	 or	 rational	








part	 of	 a	 discourse,	 it	 wants	 to	 be	 understood.	 By	 explaining,	 arguing	 or	 refuting	
something,	it	presupposes	some	form	of	a	reasoned	communication,	and	implies	shared	
structures	of	thinking	that	are	intelligible	to	others.	In	this	sense,	all	religious	discourse	is	









the	 backdrop	 of	 different	metaphysical	 frameworks	 does	 not	 therefore	 amount	 to	 an	
imposition	 of	 alien	 categories	 upon	 it,	 but	 rather	 to	 taking	 seriously	 that	 it	 has	
‘philosophical’	 weight	 even	 where	 it	 focusses	 on	 classically	 ‘religious’	 or	 ‘doctrinal’	
themes.	It	is	on	this	basis	that	it	seems	no	external	imposition	on	Vermigli’s	theological	
anthropology,	 his	 theology	 of	 justification,	 his	 Eucharistic	 thought,	 and	 his	 political	
theology	to	investigate	them	with	a	view	to	the	metaphysics	implicitly	at	work	in	them.	
The	second	 reason	why	 the	approach	 taken	 in	 this	 study	seems	warranted	 is	a	
more	 pragmatic	 one.	 We	 have	 seen	 that	 it	 yields	 fruitful	 results.	 The	 argument	 that	




some	 of	 the	 intricate	 configurations	 in	 the	 sources	 at	 hand.	 It	 would	 seem	 that	 if	 a	
hermeneutical	 lens	 enables	 readers	 to	 understand	what	 they	 are	 reading	 at	 a	 deeper	
level,	and	if	it	gives	them	tools	to	make	sense	of	and	express	what	they	have	read	more	








certainly	 not	 all	 –	 of	 Vermigli’s	 statements	 could	 make	 sense	 in	 either	 of	 the	 two	
frameworks	described.	However,	the	fact	that	not	all	his	statements	are	metaphysically	
determinate	does	not	invalidate	our	claim	about	the	complexity	of	his	metaphysics.	



























Vermigli	 envisages	 God	 and	 the	 world	 to	 relate,	 imposing	 an	 external,	 anachronistic	
category	 on	 the	 sources,	 namely,	 ‘coherence’	 as	 they	 understand	 it?	 For	 all	 of	 these	
reasons,	I	propose	to	call	Vermigli’s	metaphysics	‘complex’.		
I	moreover	suggest	that	the	degree	to	which	the	implied	metaphysics	in	Vermigli’s	








the	 Reformation	 if	 the	 implied	 metaphysical	 complexity	 we	 have	 found	 in	 Vermigli’s	
thought	can	be	seen	as	typical	for	the	Reformation.	





in	 someone	as	 scholarly	 and	academically	 vocal	 as	Vermigli.	As	we	have	 seen,	he	was	





for	 studying	 the	 implied	 metaphysics	 of	 the	 Reformation	 because	 he	 is	 articulate	 in	
‘philosophical’	terms,	especially	in	the	thought	of	Aristotle,	employing	his	categories,	such	
















Recent	developments	 in	 Luther	and	Calvin	 scholarship	highlight	a	dimension	of	
theosis,	 and	 the	believer’s	participation	 in	 the	Divine,	 in	 their	 thought.	This	dimension	
naturally	 follows	 from	 a	 participatory	 metaphysics.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Luther,	 a	 group	 of	
Finnish	Luther	experts	have	argued	that	the	heart	of	Luther’s	theology	of	human	salvation	
is	not	his	understanding	of	 justification	as	 imputed	 to	human	beings	 through	Christ	 in	
faith,	 or	 the	 simul	 iustus	 et	 peccator,	 but	 an	 understanding	 of	 human	participation	 in	
Christ.	The	Finnish	scholars	are	working	in	the	context	of	ecumenical	exchanges	between	
Lutheranism	 and	 Russian	 Orthodoxy	 and	 find	 that	 their	 reading	 of	 Luther’s	 view	 of	
justification	 resonates	 fruitfully	 with	 Orthodox	 notions	 of	 theosis	 or	 deification.1	 As	
exponents	of	this	Finnish	school	explicitly	acknowledge,	these	newly	discovered	layers	in	
																																																						
1	 The	 most	 recent	 summary	 of	 this	 view	 is:	 Risto	 Saarinen,	 “Justification	 by	 Faith:	 The	 View	 of	 the	
Mannermaa	School,”	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Martin	Luther’s	Theology,	ed.	Robert	Kolb,	Irene	Dingel,	
and	 Lubomir	 Batka	 (Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2014),	 255–59.	 As	 intimated	 by	 Saarinen’s	 title,	 Tuomo	
Mannermaa	 is	 considered	 the	 founder	of	 this	Finnish	 reappraisal	of	 Luther.	Among	his	ground-breaking	
works	count	the	following:	Tuomo	Mannermaa,	Der	im	Glauben	gegenwärtige	Christus:	Rechtfertigung	und	
















Luther’s	 work	 are	 premised	 on	 a	 realist	 metaphysical	 framework,	 especially	 on	 the	
analogy	of	being	and	metaphysical	participation.2		
As	for	Calvin,	Todd	Billings,	in	his	Calvin,	Participation	and	the	Gift,	has	rekindled	
an	 older	 reading	 of	 the	 Reformer	 which	 sees	 his	 work	 as	 premised	 on	 creaturely	
participation	 in	 the	Divine.3	 Such	an	 interpretation	paints	 a	 rather	different	picture	of	












framework	 implicitly	 sustaining	 the	 ‘classic’	 picture	 of	 Luther’s	 and	 Calvin’s	 work	 can	
therefore	be	said	to	be	largely	univocal.	What	is	more,	the	strand	of	Catholic	Reformation	
scholarship	which	goes	from	Denifle	through	Lortz	to	Bouyer,	which	we	have	seen	in	the	
introduction,	 indirectly	concurs	with	 this.	 It	holds	 that	 the	Reformation	 is	governed	by	














1	 (2002):	 36–57;	McClean,	 “Perichoresis,	 Theosis	 and	Union	with	Christ	 in	 the	Thought	of	 John	Calvin”;	






the	nature	of	metaphysical	 frameworks	 implied	 in	Luther’s	and	Calvin’s	thought,	many	
strands	 of	 more	 traditional	 Reformation	 scholarship	 converge	 to	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	
univocal.7	By	 contrast,	 the	newer	 readings	of	 Luther’s	 and	Calvin’s	work	 that	we	have	
seen,	presuppose	an	implicitly	participatory	metaphysics	at	work	in	the	latter.	
Faced	with	 these	newer	readings	of	 the	Reformers,	one	has	 three	choices:	one	
denies	 that	 they	are	 legitimate	and	discards	 them	altogether,	or	one	welcomes	 them,	








hand	 (and	 the	 same	 –	mutatis	 mutandis	 –	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Calvin).	 According	 to	 this	
hypothesis,	classical	Luther	scholarship	has	focussed	more	on	those	elements	in	Luther’s	
work	 that	 are	 sustained	 by	 a	 univocal	 metaphysics,	 whereas	 the	 Finnish	 school	
concentrates	on	other	facets,	such	as	those	which	imply	a	participatory	metaphysics.	If	






First	 of	 all,	 the	 history	 and	 development	 of	 Protestantism	 may	 be	 better	
understood	by	considering	the	long-term	effects	of	the	metaphysical	complexity	at	the	
																																																						














evolved	differently.	Peter	Martyr	Vermigli	 at	 least	partially	 inhabited	a	metaphysics	of	
participation.	Because	of	this	part	of	the	Reformation’s	legacy,	any	eventual	overturning	
of	Reformation	affirmations	cannot	have	been	an	inexorable	fate.	Even	if	it	is	granted	that	











causally	 involved	 in	 these	 developments	 has	 been	 hotly	 debated	 at	 least	 since	 Max	



















Gregory	 does.	 To	 be	 sure,	 our	 thesis	 about	 the	 metaphysical	 complexity	 of	 the	
Reformation	does	 not	make	 impossible	 the	 argument	 of	 a	 certain	 nexus	 between	 the	
Reformation	 and	 certain	 so-called	 modern	 developments.	 It	 recognizes	 this	 nexus	










meant	 that	 the	 heirs	 of	 the	 Reformation	were	 able	 to	 embrace	whatever	 framework	
became	culturally	prevalent.	If	univocal	structures	of	being	have	become	prevalent	in	the	
last	 few	 centuries	 in	 the	West,	 as	many	 commentators	 believe,15	 then	 this	 suggests	 a	
reason	why	the	univocal	strands	in	Reformation	thought	have	become	dominant.	Insofar	
as	a	certain	metaphysical	malleability	was	constitutive	of	Reformation	thought,	this	meant	
that	 it	 had	 few	 structures	 of	 resistance	 in	 place	 against	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 above-




that	 they	 did	 not	 settle	 for	 one	 metaphysical	 framework.	 “Bringing	 closure	 on	 points	 of	 metaphysical	
ambiguity,”	for	Billings,	would	not	be	desirable	(Billings,	Calvin,	Participation	and	the	Gift,	195.)	The	fact	
that	Calvin’s	thought	was	somewhat	vague	metaphysically,	left	it	“open	to	be	adapted	to	a	wide	range	of	
metaphysical	 frameworks.”	 (Ibid.,	 194.)	 However,	 this	 conclusion	 assumes	 that	 there	 is	 a	 separation	










Once	more,	 this	 indicates	 that	 those	who	wish	 causally	 and	 tightly	 to	 link	 the	
Reformation	 to	 ‘modern’	 developments	 are	 missing	 the	mark.	 If	 one	 were	 to	 charge	
Reformation	 thought	 for	being	 in	 some	ways	 complicit	 in	 these	developments,	 then	a	
more	sophisticated	line	of	argument	might	run	as	follows.	The	metaphysical	complexity	
of	 the	Reformation,	 in	 its	ability	 to	 inhabit	multiple	metaphysical	 frameworks	at	once,	
could	be	predicated	on	a	‘higher-level’	univocal	metaphysics.	This	is	because	the	condition	
of	possibility	of	a	plurality	of	metaphysical	frameworks	depends	on	the	possibility	of	an	
epistemological	 distancing	 between	 the	 thinking	 subject	 and	 the	 world.	 This	 kind	 of	




Reformation,	why	 is	 it	 that	we	 have	 become	 aware	 of	 it	 only	 recently?17	 The	 clue	 to	











16	 Étienne	 Gilson,	 Jean	 Duns	 Scot:	 introduction	 à	 ses	 positions	 fondamentales,	 Études	 de	 philosophie	
médiévale	42	(Paris:	J.	Vrin,	1952),	243–48.	










–	 in	 what	 is	 commonly	 agreed	 to	 be	 at	 least	 late	 modernity18	 –	 to	 perceive	 other	
metaphysical	frameworks	equally	present	in	Reformation	theology.	
Indeed,	we	 can	 assume	 that	 as	 the	 critical	 distance	 to	 ‘high	modernity’	 grows,	
scholars	will	 understand	more	 fully	 the	 degree	 to	which	 traditional	 understandings	 of	
Reformation	 theology	have	been	coloured	by	 the	univocal	 framework	characteristic	of	






old	 covenant).19	 Insofar	 as	 the	 Reformation	 prided	 itself	 on	 its	 faithfulness	 to	 the	





sources	of	 the	Reformation.	Our	 thesis	concerning	 the	metaphysical	 complexity	of	 the	
Reformation	 may	 have	 implications	 for	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	 such	 a	






19	The	 ‘old’	perspective	 is	exemplified	 in	 the	work	of	 the	Lutheran	Bultmann,	whereas	exponents	of	 the	
‘new’	 perspective	 include	 Sanders,	 Dunn	 and	 Wright.	 See	 Rudolf	 Bultmann,	 Theologie	 des	 Neuen	
Testaments	(Tübingen:	J.C.B.	Mohr,	1953);	E.P.	Sanders,	Paul	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1991);	James	
D.	G.	Dunn,	The	New	Perspective	on	Paul	(Grand	Rapids,	MI:	Wm.	B.	Eerdmans	Publishing	Company,	2008);	









In	 this	 sense,	 it	 is	hoped	 that	 the	present	 study	 is	not	only	a	case	study	of	 the	
implied	 metaphysics	 of	 one	 Protestant	 Reformer,	 but	 also	 an	 exercise	 in	 intellectual	
history	 in	 Annabel	 Brett’s	 sense.	 Brett	 held	 that	 “intellectual	 history	 can	 itself	 be	
understood	as	poetic”	 insofar	as	 it	“does	not	merely	unravel	 the	structure	of	what	we	
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